After the Crisis?（世行行长佐利克）

是 否 +2 论坛币

k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群

赵安豆老师微信：zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

立即领取

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币！

+2 论坛币

Great upheavals produce shock waves that widen cracks in political, economic, and security orders. Sometimes the old orders break. Yet it can be in the power of leaders and peoples to shape the directions of change.
Today, most people assume that when Edmund Burke wrote his Reflections on the Revolution in France he was denouncing a revolution that had already executed a King and Queen, and launched the Terror. But he published his work in 1790, before the cobbled streets of Paris echoed with the rumble of tumbrels and the roar of crowds at the guillotine.
1789 was one of the great upheavals in history. Although Burke offered wise warnings, most of his contemporaries expected France to tread an “English path” towards constitutional democracy.
The effects of momentous events can reverberate over time. When asked more than a century later about the impact of the French Revolution, China’s Premier Zhou Enlai allegedly replied, “It’s too soon to say.”
This year is the 20th anniversary of the peaceful revolution of 1989. The upheavals across Europe of that year, so different from 1789, brought an end to the Cold War. They led to the opening of the Berlin Wall, the freedom of Central and Eastern Europe, the unification of a democratic Germany and the reunification of Europe, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the return of Russia. To many, these tumultuous events really did feel like the “End of History,” as my friend and your professor Frank Fukuyama famously put it. Yet the European narrative moved to new chapters with the widening of what became the European Union, the creation of a common currency, and the enlargement of the NATO Alliance.
While most eyes were focused on Europe in that era, new histories were being sketched around the world: NAFTA offered a fundamental reorientation of Mexico, including toward democracy and potentially deeper integration of North America; APEC implied a new “open regionalism” that could connect a rising East Asia with the Americas bordering the Pacific; and a coalition based upon UN action reversed Iraq’s brutal conquering of Kuwait, opening the way for a Madrid Conference that initiated negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. These seeds of change were planted by forward-looking leaders who saw the opportunities amidst seismic shifts and shifting trends.
My experience then –and since – has reinforced my sense that events occur within a continuum. As Burke observed, there exists “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead and those who are to be born.”
Outcomes are not predetermined. They depend on both events and purposeful actions.
In 2009, we are living through another upheaval that is changing our world. What will be its implications for the future?
Today’s upheaval did not occur from nowhere. The seeds were planted earlier.
The last 20 years have witnessed a huge economic shift. The breakdown of the planned economies in the Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, the economic reforms in China and India, and the export-driven growth strategies of East Asia all contributed to a world market economy that vaulted from about 1 billion to 4 or 5 billion people. This shift offers enormous opportunities. But it has also shaken an international economic system forged in the middle of the 20th Century, with patched-up changes in the decades since.
Some seeds of today’s troubles were sown by the responses -- or lack of them -- to the financial crises of the late 1990s. After the Asian financial crisis, developing countries determined they never again wanted to be exposed to the tempests of globalization. Many “insured” themselves through managing exchange rates and building huge currency reserves. Some of these changes contributed to imbalances and tensions in the global economy, but for years governments muddled through amidst generally good growth.
Central banks failed to address risks building in the new economy. They seemingly mastered product price inflation in the 1980s, but most decided that asset price bubbles were difficult to identify and to restrain with monetary policy. They argued that damage to the “real economy” of jobs, production, savings, and consumption could be contained once bubbles burst, through aggressive easing of interest rates. They turned out to be wrong.
Regulators and supervisors of financial institutions were no longer grounded in reality. Financial innovation and competition vastly expanded services – including to companies and families often shunted aside in the past –but the alluringly simple design of “rational markets” theory led regulators to take a holiday from the realities of psychology, organizational behavior, systemic risks, and the complexities of markets and humans.
As in the past, the actions we take today shape future opportunities and challenges.
We need to learn the lessons from the past – without being limited by them. Too often we prepare to fight the crisis of the past rather than anticipate the crisis of the future. The one thing we can be sure about is that another upheaval will happen in your lifetimes and that it will be different from the one we are currently experiencing.
All of you at SAIS have the good fortune to be prepared to contribute, and I hope you will choose to. As you study past efforts, you may be asking: how will our world be changed by this crisis?
In 1944, the delegates at Bretton Woods seized a moment to shape a new global arrangement. They spent three weeks in New Hampshire developing a system of rules, institutions, and procedures for financial and commercial relations in the world economy.
That world has changed enormously over the past 65 years – not least with the transformations of 1989. The current upheaval is changing the landscape yet again.
Already, we can see potential shifts in power and institutions and international cooperation. In part, the shifts will depend upon how the parties adapt to new circumstances; in part, upon the rapidity of the recovery; in part, upon changes in who holds the world’s capital, technology, and human resources and what they do with them; in part, upon how countries cooperate –or do not. .

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明：姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格，未注明则拒绝

分享0 收藏0 回帖

关键词：Crisis After ISIS isi 佐利克 Crisis After 世行 佐利克

剧变形成的冲击使得政治、经济和安全秩序中存在的裂痕逐渐扩大。有时旧秩序甚至会彻底崩塌。但是，这种趋势可以让各国领导人和人民有能力改变变化的方向。

　　今天，大多数人认为，爱德蒙·柏克 (Edmund Burke) 的《法国革命论》只不过是指责法国大革命已将一位国王和一位王后送上断头台并掀起“恐怖时期”的序幕。但事实上，当隆隆作响的囚车还未辗过鹅卵石铺就的巴黎的大街小巷，断头台处人群的呼吼还未在巴黎的上空回荡之时，柏克的著作就已于1790年问世。

　　1789年是历史上一个伟大的动荡的年代。虽然柏克提出了明智的警告，但是与他同时代的大多数人预期法国将踏向民主宪政体制改革的“英国之路”。

　　这些巨变产生的影响仍然在历史的长河中回荡。一个多世纪以后，据称中国的总理周恩来被问及法国大革命的影响时，他沉吟道：“下结论为时尚早。”

　　今年是1989和平变革20周年，当年整个欧洲发生的剧变与1789年的革命截然不同，促成了冷战的结束。1989和平变革导致了柏林墙的倒塌、中欧和东欧的解放、民主德国的统一、欧洲的联合、苏联的解体以及俄罗斯的回归。对于很多人来说，这些动荡事件正如我的朋友弗兰克福山(Frank Fukuyama)教授所言，令人感觉像是“历史的终结”。然而，欧洲的后续发展到欧洲联盟的扩展，建立共同货币以及北约的扩建，而成就欧洲新的历史篇章。

　　在那个时期中，虽然人们的注意力大多集中在欧洲，但新的历史事件也在世界各地风起云涌：北美自由贸易协定(NAFTA)为墨西哥提供了根本性的调整，其中包括走向民主以及更深入地融入北美一体化；亚太经合组织(APEC)提出了新的“开放的地区主义”，使正在崛起的东亚地区与美国太平洋沿岸地区联系起来；以联合国为基础的联合行动击退了伊拉克对科威特的野蛮入侵，为“马德里会议”铺平了道路，进而启动了以色列与阿拉伯国家之间的谈判。那些具有前瞻眼光的领导人，在社会剧烈的变化和发展的趋势中看到了机遇，播撒了这些改革的种子。

　　我在当时以及之后的经验加强了我的感觉：大事的发生具有连续性。正像柏克所指出的，世间存在着一种“不仅仅涉及所有生者，还包括所有生者、死者、后代之间的合伙关系”。

　　结果不是预先确定的，而是取决于所发生的事件以及目的明确的行动。

　　2009年，我们经历着一场正在改变我们周遭世界的剧变。这场剧变将给未来产生怎样的影响？

　　当今的剧变并非凭空发生，这些种子早已埋下。

　　过去的20年间，我们见证了巨大的经济转变。苏联，中欧和东欧计划经济体系的解体；中国和印度的经济改革；以及东亚地区的出口驱动型经济增长战略等等，促进了从10亿左右增长至40或50亿的人口的世界市场经济。这种转变带来了巨大的机遇，但是同样也动摇了在20世纪中叶形成，并在接下来的几十年中几经修补的国际经济体系。

　　对于当前面临的困难，可以追溯到20世纪90年代末金融危机中的应对措施，或缺乏应对措施。在遭遇了亚洲金融危机之后，发展中国家下定决心避免再次暴露于全球化的风暴之中。许多国家通过汇率管理和建立庞大的外汇储备来给自己上“保险”。其中的一些变化造成了全球经济失衡和关系紧张，但多年来，这些国家的政府在普遍的良好增长中跌跌撞撞地走了过来。

　　中央银行无法应对新经济中产生的各种风险。表面上看来，他们控制了二十世纪八十年代的物价膨胀，而大多数人认为，在鉴别及利用货币政策来遏制资产价格泡沫的方面困难重重。他们认为，一旦大幅降低利率导致泡沫破灭，就业、生产、储蓄及消费等“实体经济”都将受到损坏。而事实证明他们的观点是错误的。

　　监管和监督机构的政策行动与现实脱节。金融的创新和竞争极大扩展了服务范围，过去通常被忽视的企业和家庭也被纳入其中。但是“理性市场”诱人的简单设计理论导致监管机构严重地忽视了心理学、机构体制、系统性风险以及市场与民众相关的复杂性等现实问题。

　　和过去一样，今天我们采取的行动必将是未来机遇和挑战的根源。

　　我们要从历史事件中吸取教训，亦不能拘泥于此。面对已经发生的危机我们往往可以兵来将挡，而不是预测未来的危机。唯一肯定的是我们必然要面临一场巨变，并且它将有别于我们正在经历的这场危机。

　　今天在座SAIS的每一个人，你们都有机会在这场巨变中有所作为，而我也非常期待你们的表现。反思过去，您可能会问：这场危机将如何改变我们的世界发展？

　　1944 年，“布雷顿森林会议”的代表们抓住时机，建立起一套全新的世界经济秩序。代表们在新罕布什尔州花了三个星期，为世界经济的金融和商业关系构建并制定了一系列的规则、机构体系及制度。

　　此后的六十五年间，世界格局发生了巨大变化(不仅包括1989年和平变革)，而当前这场巨变将再次调整世界的景观。

　　其实我们已经体会到各种力量和机构以及在国际合作方面的潜在变化。一方面，这一转变将取决于各方如何适应新的形势；另一方面，取决于经济的快速复苏；再一方面，取决于谁掌握并利用世界资本、技术和人力资源的人员；最后，还取决于国家之间的合作(或不合作)。

What are the perceptions and realities of power after this crisis?

The current assumption is that the post-crisis political economy will reflect the rising influence of China, probably of India, and of other large emerging economies. Supposedly, the United States, the epicenter of the financial crisis, will see its economic power and influence diminish.

There are good reasons for this perception. China has responded strongly to the crisis, both in terms of stimulus and monetary policies, and it seems to have a deep treasure chest to back up its first moves. China has enjoyed a rapid recovery, which has assisted others, underscoring China’s growing influence.

Indeed, today, China acts as a stabilizing force in the global economy. Together, China and India account for 8.5 percent of world output. They and other developing countries are growing substantially more rapidly than developed countries.

And yet … China’s future is not yet determined. Its rapid recovery in 2009 was fueled by an expansion of credit of 26 percent of GDP in the first eight months of this year. This flood is now easing, and authorities are likely to limit it further for fear of effects on asset prices, asset quality, and eventually general inflation. China still faces big uncertainties in 2010.

China’s leaders recognize these risks, including the continued dependence of China and other emerging economies on export-led growth. It will not be easy for China to shift to increasing reliance on domestic demand, especially to greater consumption that could help balance world growth while contributing to China’s goal of a more “ harmonious society.” China’s protected service sector, including financial services, limits opportunities for entrepreneurs and increases in productivity.

The United States, in turn, has been hit hard by the crisis. But America has a culture of resilience to set-backs, adapting to new circumstances and remaking itself.

The future for the United States will depend on whether and how it will address large deficits, recover without inflation that could undermine its credit and currency, and overhaul its financial system to preserve innovation while adding to safety and soundness. The United States also needs to help people adjust to change, so that it can maintain its greatest trump card: openness to trade, investment, people, and ideas. The geopoliticians will be on the watch for signs that America’s economic troubles are leading to a weakening of U.S. confidence, energy and resources to project its interests globally in cooperation with others.

Japan is the first leading industrial power to experience a political upheaval in the wake of the crisis. The election of the Democratic Party of Japan could create a sustainable two-party democracy for the first time in the country’s history.

Japan rose from the ashes of World War II as a “trading state,” the model for export-led growth. It is not clear that the old export model of growth will be sustainable in a more “balanced” global economy that does not rely so heavily on the U.S. consumer. An aging Japan will have new consumption needs. A global economy with more poles of growth could offer Japan new markets, especially for its impressive capabilities to use energy efficiently.

The world will be deeply interested in the shape of a Japanese foreign policy that can be sustained across parties and that might assume new responsibilities. Such a foreign policy could build on Japan’s experiences in development. Japan could deepen cooperation with other Asia-Pacific actors in ASEAN, Australia, China, and Korea, while maintaining its global role, especially through relations with the United States. Development opportunities in Africa, Latin America, Central Asia, and the Middle East would also enable Japan to “do well while doing good.”

The European Union may have been slow to recognize that this economic crisis was the first big test of the New Europe made possible by the revolutions of 1989. But it adapted relatively quickly, and European institutions may come out stronger for it.

Central and Eastern European economies were hit especially hard by the crisis. And their problems are far from over. At least for European Union members, however, the support offered by the European Commission, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the European Investment Bank – with assistance from the World Bank Group -- has been critical. It appears that the European banks that invested in their Central and Eastern European neighbors are staying with them. The good strategic news is that the European states, for all their internal debates and negotiations, have recognized their interdependence. Under stress, this time, Europe did not splinter.

The European Central Bank played a decisive role under the able leadership of its president, Jean-Claude Trichet. The ECB walked a fine line in supporting the European financial system and even helping Europeans outside the Eurozone, while assuring the Euro’s credibility. As a result, newer EU members outside the Eurozone may well strive to gain its security.

Yet, amidst tighter economic times, the European Union must still face insecurities. Its energy vulnerability feeds worries, aggravating difficult relations with its neighbors to the east, especially Ukraine and Russia. The Balkans still smolder, and inattention to Bosnia could revive apprehensions about the EU’s ability to offer security, even on its own continent. The EU and Turkey have yet to cultivate a common view of their shared future. As its demographics age, Europe will also struggle with the integration of immigrants.

South East Asia may also have been given a boost by the crisis – depending on how opportunities are seized. The region lies at a geographic crossroads between India and China, two rising powers. ASEAN seems to have recognized the moment, and has taken actions to deepen its integration even while reaching out to others.

Given the sizeable weight of Indonesia and the rising influence of Vietnam, their sound performance amidst economic turmoil has stood in sharp contrast to a decade ago. But there remain questions of adjustments and political transitions in countries such as Thailand and Malaysia. There is also a question of whether others will recognize the emerging ASEAN. China and India seem to be doing so – but will North America and the European Union?

For others, the long-term impact of the crisis may depend upon commodities, especially oil prices, which, in recent years, gave high returns. When the oil price is at $100, these countries are strong. When it is at $30, most are in serious trouble. This reliance on oil and commodities is a precarious basis upon which to build an economy in a world that is struggling to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels, and in which commodity prices gyrate as investors move in and out of an “asset class.” Will countries use these returns wisely – to diversify and build broader-based economic development? These are the questions for Russia, countries in the Gulf, and some countries in Latin America and Africa.

Understanding shifting power relations is fundamental for shaping the future -- as the Bretton Woods’ delegates appreciated. The political basis for that system was forged through a shared experience in failed responsibility after World War I and a clear assessment of power after World War II. Change those power relations -- and the nature of the markets that connect them -- and the system looks out of touch.

危机过后的预期结果与现实状况？

　　目前普遍认为，危机后的政治经济形势将会大幅提升中国, 可能还有印度，及其它大型新兴经济体在国际间的影响力。据估计，处于金融危机中心的美国，其经济实力和国际影响力将会遭到一定程度的削弱。

　　这一预测有充分的现实依据。中国积极应对此次金融危机，采取了多种行之有效的经济刺激计划和货币政策。中国的国库储备应该足以支持其前期措施的有效实施。中国经济的迅速恢复有效推动了其它国家走出危机阴霾的步伐，充分体现了中国日益扩大的国际影响力。

　　毋庸置疑，当今中国已经成为推动全球经济稳定发展的中坚力量。中国与印度的产出占到全球产出总量的 8.5%。它们及其它发展中国家的发展速度远远快于发达国家。

　　然而，中国的未来尚未确定。中国在 2009 年的迅速发展，得益于今年头8个月 GDP的26%的信贷扩张。目前，金融危机的洪潮已得到初步缓解，有关方面可能会就此进行调控，以防对资产价值和资产质量造成不良影响，甚至最终导致全面的通货膨胀。中国在2010年仍将面临巨大的不确定性。

　　中国领导人对这些风险有着清醒的认识，其中包括中国及其它新兴经济体对出口型增长的持续依赖。中国要想通过扩大内需，尤其是以刺激消费的方式，实现“和谐社会”的目标并帮助平衡全球发展，并非易事。受中国保护的服务行业，包括金融服务，限制了企业的投资和参与机会以及生产力的提高。

　　美国，反过来，是这次经济危机的重灾区。但是美国有着抵御衰退，适应新形势和重新崛起的文化。

　　美国的未来取决于能否采取适当的措施解决巨额赤字问题，在保证信贷和货币系统不会遭受通货膨胀侵害的前提下实现经济复苏，并在彻底改革金融系统的同时确保系统的安全与完善。美国还需要帮助民众适应变化，以便确保它的最大的优势：对贸易、投资、民众和观念的开放。地缘政治学者们将会非常关注相关经济现象，以便了解美国的经济困境正如何削弱美国与其它国家在全球范围内合作的信心、能源和资源优势。

　　日本是因这次经济危机而发生政治动荡的首个工业强国。日本民主党的当选掀开了日本历史上两大政党民主执政的序幕。

　　日本从二战的废墟中迅速崛起，成为典型的出口增长型“贸易国”。旧的出口增长模式能否在日趋“平衡”的全球经济中保持可持续性，而不严重依赖于美国消费者，目前尚不可知。日本老龄化将引发新的消费需求。实现多极增长的全球经济能够为日本提供众多新的市场，尤其可以帮助其大幅提升利用能源的能力。

　　对于日本如何制定各党派均认可且可能承担更多责任的外交政策，全世界都将投来关注的目光。日本外交政策的制定可以该国的发展经验为基础。日本可以深化其与东盟中的其它亚太成员国、澳大利亚、中国及韩国的合作关系，并借助与美国的关系维护其国际地位。在非洲、拉丁美洲、中亚以及中东的开发项目也将帮助日本实现国际声誉和经济效益“双丰收”。

　　欧盟可能后来才意识到，这次经济危机是自 1989 年和平变革以来新欧洲经历的首次严峻考验。但是，欧盟此次的响应速度相对迅速，欧洲的各大机构也可能因此具备更强的风险抵御能力。

　　中欧和东欧经济体是这次经济危机的重灾区，它们的问题远未得到解决。但是，至少对于欧盟成员国来讲，欧盟委员会、欧洲复兴开发银行和欧洲投资银行提供的支持以及世界银行集团提供的协助至关重要。向中欧和东欧邻国投资的欧洲银行在一如既往地提供支持。战略上的有利消息是，通过激烈的内部辩论和谈判，欧洲各国最终承认了它们之间的相互依赖关系。此次，重压之下的欧洲并未出现四分五裂的局面。

　　欧洲中央银行在其行长让-克洛德·特里谢(Jean-Claude Trichet)的英明领导下，发挥着决定性的作用。欧洲中央银行在支持欧洲金融系统、帮助欧元区以外的欧洲人和确保欧元可信度等方面，采取了一条切实可行的路线。因此，欧元区以外的新欧盟成员可能会极力争取获得它的安全保护。

　　但是，在严酷的经济时期，欧盟同样会面临非安全因素的挑战。其能源劣势引发的忧虑，恶化了其与东方邻国，尤其是与乌克兰和俄罗斯之间本已紧张的关系。巴尔干半岛依然浓烟四起。波斯尼亚局势的恶化可能导致人们对欧盟是否有能力提供安全产生怀疑，甚至在欧洲大陆本土也有这样的担忧。 欧盟和土耳其必须就其共同的未来达成共识。随着人口的老龄化，欧洲也将面临移民融合的问题。

　　东南亚也可能因经济危机的影响而面临类似问题的加剧——具体取决于如何抓住机遇。该地区位于印度和中国这两个新兴大国的地理交叉区域。东盟似乎已经意识到了形势的严峻，并已采取各种措施以深化这种融合，甚至不会错过提供外援的机会。

　　印度尼西亚的地位不断提高，越南的影响力也在日益扩大，这些国家在此次经济动荡中保持了良好运转，与十年前的窘迫境况不可同日而语。但是在泰国和马来西亚等国家，依然存在着调整问题和政权更迭问题。此外，还存在其它国家是否承认新兴的东盟这一问题。中国和印度似乎对东盟表示承认 – 但北美和欧盟会持何种态度呢？

　　对于其它国家来讲，经济危机的长期影响可能有赖于石油商品的状况，尤其是石油价格，而近几年这一产业获得了高昂的回报率。石油价格高达 100 美元时，这些国家的经济实力非常雄厚。而当石油价格为30美元时，它们中的大多数则会陷入严重的困境。当今世界正在竭力降低对化石燃料的依赖程度，并且石油商品价格随投资人在“资产级别”中的循环往复发生改变。这一现实导致这种对石油和石油商品出口的严重依赖无法为经济体的构建提供一个稳定的基础。这些国家能否善加利用高昂的石油回报——将之用于实现经济发展的多元化？这些是俄罗斯、海湾国家以及某些拉美和非洲国家需要考虑的问题。

　　“布雷顿森林体系”的代表已深刻体会到，对权力关系转变的认识是构筑未来的基石。通过对一战后未履行责任的共同分析，以及对二战后权力的明确评估，逐步形成了该体系的政治基础。权力关系一旦发生变化，与之相关的市场性质就会随之改变，体系也将走向分崩离析。

Let’s examine a few examples: Will the U.S. dollar remain the predominant reserve currency?
The Bretton Woods currency system gave way in 1973 to floating rates, with the dollar as the world’s main reserve currency. For all the questions about the dollar’s reliability as a reserve currency, its value strengthened during the crisis as it offered investors a safe haven.
The United States is incredibly fortunate that the dollar enjoys this special status. When I work with countries struggling to pay for budgets or finance trade deficits, I reflect on how Americans do not spend a moment considering the unique advantages of being able to issue bonds and print money freely. The histories of the Napoleonic wars tell of great campaigns and battles, but the ultimate victory of Britain and its coalition depended on the dry chapter about Pitt’s restoration of Britain’s credit.
The United States would be mistaken to take for granted the dollar’s place as the world’s predominant reserve currency. Looking forward, there will increasingly be other options to the dollar.
Given the ECB’s recent performance, there is every reason to believe that the Euro’s acceptability could grow. The influence of the Euro will depend in part upon the competitiveness of European Union countries in future years, and the depth and liquidity of its financial markets. Demographics and growth prospects will also matter. But Euro financing offers a respectable alternative if the dollar is weak.
Moreover, China is moving toward gradual internationalization of its currency. China is making it easier for trading partners to do business in Renminbi – for example, through currency swaps. We are likely to see this shift in the world of investment as well: for the first time this month, China issued sovereign bonds in Renminbi to offshore investors. China recently announced that foreign companies will be able to list their stocks in China, a step toward making Shanghai an international financial center. As a major importer of commodities, one can imagine new benchmark indices established at Shanghai or other Chinese ports, eventually in Renminbi.
Chinese leaders will be cautious. Most want to retain the control that comes from a closed capital account. Financial and banking markets are likely to continue to be subject to various tools of intervention and control. Yet I expect China will be inevitably drawn outward. Over 10 to 20 years, the Renminbi will evolve into a force in financial markets.
Countries and markets may also experiment with financings denominated in Special Drawing Rights –or SDRs— which reflect a portfolio of major currencies.

Of course, the U.S. dollar is and will remain a major currency. But the Greenback’s fortunes will depend heavily on U.S. choices. Will the United States resolve its debt problems without a resort to inflation? Can America establish long-term discipline over spending and its budget deficit? Is the country restoring a healthy financial sector capacity for innovation, liquidity, and returns, without producing the same risk of big bubbles and institutional breakdown? The dollar’s value will also depend on the extent to which we see the return of a dynamic, innovative private sector economy.
Power relations are being questioned within countries as well. Central Banks have played a huge role in this crisis.
Will democratic governments permit independent central banks to assume even more authority?
The U.S. Congress was surprised to learn of the scope of the Federal Reserve’s authority to create funds, buy assets, devise global swap lines, and make transactions outside the usual process for expending public monies.
The Congress has had an uneasy relationship with banks and bankers since Alexander Hamilton. It took the United States until 1913 to set up a central bank. The Federal Reserve earned its hard-won independence over years of effort.
So it should not be a surprise that American democracy is hesitating about authorizing the Fed to supervise systemic banking risks as well as operate monetary policy, adding to its power.
In the United Kingdom there is a debate about the roles of the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority. Euro-zone countries face the issue, too, with the added complexity of multiple national supervisory authorities. It is a topic for rising developing countries with increasingly developed banking and financial markets as well.
Central banks performed impressively once the full force of the crisis hit. But there are reasonable questions about how they handled the build-up, including asset price inflation and significant failures of supervision. We have yet to see whether Central Banks can handle the recovery without letting inflation get out of control.
Stanley Fischer, Israel’s central bank governor and a former IMF deputy, makes a case for combining the tools of monetary policy and prudential standards supervision in the central bank, based on organizational effectiveness. Others suggest that one function will inevitably be treated as a poor cousin, or that one authority for both magnifies the risk of errors without a second opinion. Some even suggest a conflict of interest.
This debate will reflect different political traditions and attitudes towards banks and central banks. In the United States, it will be difficult to vest the independent and powerful technocrats at the Federal Reserve with more authority. My reading of recent crisis management is that the Treasury Department needed greater authority to pull together a bevy of different regulators. Moreover, the Treasury is an Executive department, and therefore Congress and the public can more directly oversee how it uses any added authority.

Another legacy of the Bretton Woods architects is our global trading system.
Is it keeping up with the demands of the global economy?
The answer is an unequivocal “no.”
Looking at the positive side, the cataclysmic experiences of economic isolationism of the 1930s have cautioned most government not to risk a sequel. So far, traditional trade protectionism has been a low-grade fever. But the temperature is rising.

The political economy of trade is epitomized by the “bicycle theory”: Given the local pulls of protectionist producers in most countries, the only way to counter their gravitational force is by forging forward with a liberalizing trade agenda. The potential gains of opening markets can then help mobilize interests that will counter those clamoring for barriers.
Today the pedals are hardly moving the Doha Round in the WTO. Moreover, with an agenda framed almost a decade ago, the Doha Round is fast falling behind the new challenges. We should get the Doha Round done promptly – -- and then look ahead.
The Doha Round could cut, discipline, and even eliminate some agricultural subsidies that for years were left outside the rules-based trading system. It could modestly open markets for manufacturing and agricultural goods in developed and major developing economies. It could “bind” barriers of major developing countries at much lower levels, increasing the sense of mutual contributions and limiting the risks of big jumps in tariffs. The Doha Round could also open service markets and cut developed country tariff peaks that limit basic manufacturing and value-added production in poorer countries. The Round could correct rules that have been bent to limit trade too freely. These are real gains and would demonstrate the capability of developed and major emerging economies to compromise to achieve a mutual and systemic interest.
Once Doha is achieved, we need to move quickly to a new agenda. Regional integration is part of globalization, but we need rules that enable countries to capture the benefits of deeper and comprehensive liberalization with others while encouraging an open regionalism. The WTO needs to support the climate change agenda without recourse to new carbon tariffs. We need counters against the financial and subsidy protectionism that arose out of the crisis. We need lower barriers to South-South trade. The services trade must be expanded to match the opportunities for development and growth. We need more help for the poorest countries that have been less able to seize growth opportunities from trade.
The new agenda needs to build on early efforts by WTO’s Director General, Pascal Lamy, supported by the World Bank Group, to link trade facilitation to aid for trade. To capitalize on lower barriers to trade, poorer countries need: regional integration to build bigger markets and access for land-locked countries; energy; infrastructure; logistics systems; ready access to trade finance; assistance with standards; and streamlined customs and border procedures. It used to take two days for trucks to clear the border between Kenya and Uganda. Today, a one-stop border post that the World Bank helped establish has cut down the transfer time to two hours or less.
The Bretton Woods system was forged by 44 countries at a time that power was concentrated in a small number of states. The great waves of decolonization were just stirring; the few developing countries were seen as objects, not subjects, of history. That world is long passed. The new realities of political economy demand a different system.
What will be the role of developing countries after the crisis?
The crisis has underscored the growing importance of the large emerging economies, especially China and India, but others as well. In effect, the world economy is being “rebalanced” toward the relative shares of some two hundred years ago, before the industrial revolution, plus a new North America.
The rising developing economies should play a key role in the recovery. Most forecasters expect demand to be tepid, with a pullback by the U.S. consumer. Many developing countries could expand demand if they can get access to financing. They have fiscal space to borrow, but cannot get the volumes they need at reasonable prices without crowding out their private sectors. Moreover, the middle income countries are home to 70 percent of the world’s extreme poor. The World Bank Group and the regional development banks can assist.
Looking beyond, a more balanced and inclusive growth model for the world would benefit from multiple poles of growth. With investments in infrastructure, people, and private businesses, countries in Latin America, Asia, and the broader Middle East could contribute to a “New Normal” for the world economy.
Over time, Africa can also become a pole of growth. The messages I hear in most African countries are the same: Africans want energy, infrastructure, more productive agriculture, a dynamic private sector, and regionally integrated markets linked to open trade. It is a message one might have heard in a devastated Europe 60 years ago.
Prior to the crisis, the growth rates of a number of African countries were achieving impressive levels with consistency. Coming out of the crisis, there could be a new opportunity. Some Chinese manufacturing firms, with government support, are considering shifting their basic production to Africa. The World Bank Group is working with China to explore the development of new industrial zones that match infrastructure, energy, and training with these ventures.
China’s African prospects -- which include resource development and infrastructure -- are likely to be complemented by others. Brazil is interested in sharing its agricultural development experience. India is building railways. These are the early days of a trend that will build.
The World Bank Group can offer a counterweight to financial and trade protectionism by supporting this development globally: We have launched a new Asset Management Corporation, through IFC, our private sector arm, to invest in banks, equity, infrastructure, and debt restructuring. We have a parallel effort to support and invest in the development of local currency bond markets. Longer term investors –such as sovereign and pension funds—now recognize that developed markets pose risks, too, and developing markets can offer good growth prospects.

Conclusion

Coming out of this crisis, we have an opportunity to reshape our policies, architecture, and institutions. We have an opportunity to craft a new global system for a 21st Century of “Responsible Globalization” – one that would encourage balanced global growth and financial stability, embrace global efforts to counter climate change, and advance opportunity for the poorest. It means expanding the benefits of open markets and trade, investments, competition, innovation, entrepreneurialism, growth, information – and debates on ideas. It must be a globalization that is both inclusive and sustainable – expanding opportunity with care for the environment.

Yet it won’t happen by itself.

At the G-20 Summit in London in April, leaders stared into an economic abyss. The danger today is not freefall, but complacency. As the crisis wanes, it will be harder to press countries to cooperate in “building back better.” Peer review of a new Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth agreed at last week’s G-20 Summit is a good start, but it will require a new level of international cooperation and coordination, including a new willingness to take the findings of global monitoring seriously. Peer review will need to be peer pressure.

Climate change poses as early test. A key task at Copenhagen in December will be to create incentives for developing countries to participate in low carbon growth. The decision-makers will need to frame an ongoing process that cuts greenhouse gases while encouraging technological change, adaptation, and growth.

We need a system of international political economy that reflects a new multipolarity of growth. It needs to integrate rising economic powers as “responsible stakeholders” while recognizing that these countries are still home to hundreds of millions of poor and face staggering challenges of development. It needs to engage the energies and support of developed countries, whose publics feel the heavy burdens of debt, competitive anxieties, and feel that the new powers must share responsibilities. It needs to help offer a hand to the poorest and weakest countries, the 1.6 billion people who still live without electricity, and the “Bottom Billion” trapped in poverty because of conflict and broken governance.

Global finance and currencies. The trading system. Inclusive and sustainable development. Climate change. States struggling with fragility and conflicts. And a host of other security issues. Each topic is important on its own. But each interconnects with the others.

The countries of the world will never deal effectively with this agenda unless they cooperate. The economic multilateralism of another age does not reflect today’s realities. We need to modernize Multilateralism and Markets.

As agreed in Pittsburgh last week, the G-20 should become the premier forum for international economic cooperation among the advanced industrialized countries and rising powers. But it cannot be a stand-alone committee. Nor can it ignore the voices of the over 160 countries left outside.

The G-20 should operate as a “Steering Group” across a network of countries and international institutions. It could recognize the interconnections among issues and foster points of mutual interest. This system cannot be hierarchical, and it should not be bureaucratic. If given a push, the topics could be pursued through other negotiating groups, international regimes, or global and regional institutions. The IMF, World Bank Group, WTO, Financial Stability Board, and UN bodies could alert countries to issues, provide analyses, build cooperative solutions, and help execute the policies.

To be effective and strengthen their legitimacy, the international institutions must also evolve. Their voting shares should reflect the weights and new responsibilities of emerging powers, while assuring a voice for the poor. They need the transparency and agility to work within networks of private businesses, foundations, and civil societies, as well as with one another.

The old international economic order was struggling to keep up with change before the crisis. Today’s upheaval has revealed the stark gaps and compelling needs. It is time we caught up and moved ahead.

The question is whether leaders can cooperate in steering the changes. They will be drawn to the interests of the national publics they represent, as they should. Yet they also will be challenged to recognize and build common interests, not only case-by-case, but through institutions reflecting a “Responsible Globalization.”

Bretton Woods is being overhauled before our eyes. This time, it will take longer than three weeks in New Hampshire. It will have more participants. But it is just as necessary. The next upheaval, whatever it may be, is taking form now. Shape it or be shaped by it.

我们来看几个例子：

　　美元是否仍将是主要储备货币？

　　“布雷顿森林货币体系”在1973年让位于浮动利率，以美元作为世界主要储备货币。作为储备货币的美元尽管在可靠性上存在种种问题，却因其在经济危机期间为投资者提供了安全的避风港而得以升值。

　　由于美元享有这种特殊地位,使美国拥有令人难以置信的幸运。在同各国一道为支付预算或填补贸易赤字而努力时，我也在思考，为何美国会忽视自由发行债券及印制钞票这一独特的优势。有关拿破仑的史籍都对其重大战役及战斗进行了浓墨重彩的描写，其实那些平淡的历史章节所记载当时英国小皮特执政所采取的恢复信贷政策，才是决定了英国及其盟国的最终胜利。

　　如果美国想当然地认为美元将维持其主要储备货币的地位，这显然是错误的想法。从未来的角度来看，除美元之外，我们的选择将越来越多。

　　鉴于欧洲中央银行(ECB)近期的表现，我们有充分理由相信欧元的接受度将会上升。欧元产生的影响部分取决于欧盟各国在未来几年内的竞争力及其金融市场的深度与流动性。人口和经济增长前景也与此密切相关。但在美元疲软之时，欧元融资不失为可靠的替代方案。

　　除此以外，中国也正在逐步推进其货币的国际化。中国政府正通过货币互换等方式为贸易伙伴使用人民币开展业务提供便利。我们在投资领域同样能看到这样的转变：中国已于本月首次向海外投资者发行以人民币计价的主权债券。中国政府近期还宣布允许外国公司在华上市，从而迈出了将上海打造成为国际金融中心的重要一步。各主要商品进口国可以想见，在上海或中国其它港口城市最终将确立全新的人民币基准指数。

　　中国的领导人仍将持谨慎态度。其中多数希望保留封闭资本账户的控制力。各类干预和控制工具可能继续在金融与银行市场发挥作用。即便如此，我依然认为，中国势必应时而出。经过十年至二十年的时间，人民币将发展成为金融市场上一股重要的力量。

　　各国及市场也可在特别提款权(即SDR，反映主要货币组合)指定的资金方面进行尝试。

　　当然，美元现在和未来都仍然是主要货币。但美元的走势将很大程度上取决于美国的选择。美国是否放弃凭借通货膨胀来解决自身债务问题？美国能否针对支出与预算赤字制定长期规则？国家是否正在恢复健康金融部门的创新、流动性及收益职能，同时不会引发类似巨大泡沫以及体制瓦解的风险？此外，美元的价值也还取决于动态、创新的私营部门经济能带来多少回报。

　　权力关系在国家内部同样受到质疑。中央银行在这场危机中发挥了巨大作用。

民主政府是否会允许独立的中央银行执掌更大权力？

　　联邦储备系统的权力范围涉及创建基金、购置资产、规定全球换汇额度以及开展公共资金支出一般流程以外的交易等方面，美国国会曾对此表示惊讶。

　　国会与各银行及银行家之间的关系自亚历山大?汉密尔顿(Alexander Hamilton)时起一向不睦；最终导致1913年美国成立中央银行。联邦储备系统在多年努力之后才赢得来之不易的独立。

　　因此，对于授权美联储监督银行业系统风险及操作货币政策、扩大其权力范围，美国民主政府有所踌躇也不应感到意外。

　　英国存在有关英格兰银行与英国金融服务管理局的角色之争。多个国家监管机构参与则会增加复杂性，欧元区国家同样面临这一问题。正在崛起的发展中国家当中，随着银行与金融市场日渐成熟，这也将成为一个课题。

　　在危机来势最为凶猛之时，中央银行的表现令人印象深刻。但在处理逐步建设方面尚存在一定问题，包括资产价格膨胀以及监管重大失误。我们还未看到央行能否在避免通货膨胀失控的同时提出恢复举措。

　　以色列央行行长、此前曾任国际货币基金组织代表的斯坦利·费希尔(Stanley Fischer)提出，或可在组织有效的基础上将中央银行的货币政策和审慎标准监管工具相结合。另有声音认为，其中难免有一方沦为配角，如将机构合二为一，则或因缺少其它意见而增加犯错误的风险。一些人甚至暗示会产生利益冲突。

　　上述争论反映出在对待银行和中央银行方面迥然不同的政治传统及态度。美联储当中独立、权威的技术专家将很难在美国获得更多职权。对于最近的危机管理我的理解是，需要赋予财政部更大的权力，才能使各监管机构同心协力。不仅如此，美国财政部还是一个行政部门，因此如其行使的权力增加，也会受到国会和公众更为直接的监督。

“布雷顿森林体系”的另一遗产是全球贸易系统。

　　它是否能跟上全球经济需求变化的步伐？

　　毫无疑问，答案是否定的。

　　从积极的方面看，二十世纪三十年代经济孤立主义的灾难性经验为很多政府敲响了警钟：切莫旧幕重演。到目前为止，人们对传统贸易保护主义的热情一向不高。不过这种热情在逐渐升温。

　　贸易的政治经济集中体现于“自行车原理”：目前大多数国家存在地方保护主义生产者势力，因而对抗其保护主义力量的唯一办法是努力加速贸易自由化进程。这样，开放市场所带来的潜在裨益可帮助人们实现诸多利益，以反击那些鼓吹贸易壁垒者。

　　然而如今，世界贸易组织(WTO)多哈回合谈判已经几近搁浅。此外，由于多哈回合谈判的日程制定于十年前，因此该谈判的进程难以追上新挑战接踵而至的步伐。我们应及早完成多哈回合谈判，然后开启新征程。

　　多哈回合谈判可以削减、规范，甚至取消多年来脱离规则化贸易系统约束的一些农业补贴。它可以适度打开发达国家和主要发展中国家制造产品及农产品的市场。它可以将主要发展中国家的贸易壁垒“约束”在一个大为降低的水平，进而增强互利意识，控制关税大幅上调的风险。多哈回合谈判还可以打开服务市场，削减限制了贫穷国家基本制造业和附加值生产的发达国家关税上限。针对过于自由地对贸易施加限制的规则，多哈回合谈判可以进行更正。上述都是实实在在的利益，这些利益将展现发达国家和主要新兴国家通过妥协实现系统性共同利益的能力。

　　一旦多哈回合谈判得以完成，我们需要立即启动新的日程。诚然，区域一体化是全球化的一部分，但是我们需要新的规则，使各国能够在鼓励开放区域主义的同时，抓住面向区域以外更深入、更广泛的自由化所能够带来的利益。世界贸易组织需要以不再借助新的碳排放税的方式支持气候变化日程。我们需要对抗当前金融危机所催生的金融保护主义和补贴保护主义。我们需要减轻南南贸易的壁垒。必须扩大服务贸易，使之与发展和增长机遇相协调。我们需要向最贫穷的国家提供更多援助，因为对于这些国家而言，抓住贸易带来的增长机遇已愈加困难。

　　新日程的建立需要的前期工作由世界贸易组织总干事帕斯卡·拉米(Pascal Lamy)承担，他负责在世界银行集团的支持下将促进贸易与贸易援助联系起来。要利用降低的贸易壁垒，贫穷国家需要：区域一体化(用以为内陆国家建立更大的市场，创造更多进入市场的机会)、能源、基础设施、物流系统、便利充足的贸易融资、标准化的援助和简化的海关及边境手续。过去，在肯尼亚和乌干达两国间办理边境手续需要两天时间。而如今，由世界银行帮助建立的一站式边境哨所使递交时间减少两个小时或更多。

　　“布雷顿森林体系”由44个国家共同制定，而其制定的时代背景是权力集中在少数国家手上。非殖民化的大潮尚处于萌动阶段，少数的几个发展中国家只是历史的被支配者，而非主宰者。那个世界早已一去不复返。当今新的政治经济现状要求建立新的系统。