【出版时间及名称】:2010年全球投资银行业展望
【作者】:摩根斯坦利
【文件格式】:pdf
【页数】:76
【目录或简介】:
Our argument in a nutshell
2010 will be a pivotal year for investment banks. With global
securities markets undergoing profound cyclical and
structural change, the key question in the minds of investors
and managements is how far regulation and the economy
will challenge profitability and how the industry will be
reshaped. Will the core of regulated banks disappoint, and
non-banks and scale players seize a disproportionate share
of industry profits? Who will be the winners and losers?
This Morgan Stanley-Oliver Wyman research project seeks
to explore the outlook, range of outcomes and implications
for the leading Wholesale and Investment banks, as well as
the wider implications for exchanges, IDBs and asset
managers. Although the industry conclusions are largely
joint, any stock-specific or valuation considerations solely
reflect the views of Morgan Stanley Research, not Oliver
Wyman.
Our base case for 2010 is that investment banking
industry revenues drop 10-15% before marks as
extraordinary gains pass and margins tighten. We note
revenues could be modestly up post marks. This assumes
underlying fixed income trading revenues fall 20-25%, with
lower marks making good much of this decline. We look for
equity trading up ~5-10%, reflecting in part the fairly sluggish
start for ECM and equities in Q1. We run several scenarios
around our base case, shown in Exhibit 1.
Bid-ask spreads have tightened again, giving the edge to
‘flow monsters’ or players applying scarce balance
sheet with a clear focus. We estimate European credit
bid/ask spreads are ~75% lower than the Q109 peak, placing
greater demands on scale, trading efficiency and electronic
platforms. This environment reinforces winning market share
through effective trading, widening footprint, and exploiting
new growth pockets such as emerging markets.
We see some long-term growth areas, but lower leverage
will curb upside. There are still long-term growth
opportunities for the industry in Asia/EM, absolute return
investing and buy-side deepening, dis-intermediation and
FIG ALM. But with much lower leverage in the system,
outsized growth for the winners will have to come from
market share or outstanding business portfolio.
Regulation is the biggest swing factor. A coordinated
portfolio of regulation is appropriate for the industry, and
under this base case we expect regulations to cost the
industry ~4% of ROE. However, we see material risk of a
‘punitive’ outcome, where the industry’s ability to transmit
any leverage, maturity transformation and potentially even
intermediate into the corporate economy is severely
damaged. There is limited time for impact assessment
across such a wide range of important policy issues (e.g.
current debates on CDS, CCPs) and scope for damaging
regulatory fragmentation. We believe a punitive outcome
would create a ~8% drag on ROE, resulting in dramatic
industry downsizing and margin expansion. In our base case,
compensation ratios would probably need to stay at 2009
adjusted levels (~35% of revenues) and Revenues/Assets
climb 20% to deliver 15% ROE. A good number of players
could become far less profitable without brave decisions.
Funding, leverage and capital reforms are critical. For
example, with an estimated ~