<games and information-an introduction to the game theory>一本很好的博弈论入门书籍（PDF格式的），Eric Rasmusen编的,内容非常丰富，不过都是E文， 以下是他的目录，有三大部分

Contents1
(starred sections are less important)
Preface
Contents and Purpose
Changes in the Second Edition
Changes in the Third Edition
Using the Book
The Level of Mathematics
Other Books
Acknowledgements
Introduction
History
Game Theory's Method
Exemplifying Theory
This Book's Style
Notes
PART I GAME THEORY
1 The Rules of the Game
1.1 De¯nitions
1.2 Dominant Strategies: The Prisoner's Dilemma
1.3 Iterated Dominance: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
1.4 Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle of the Sexes, and
Ranked Coordination

2
1.5 Focal Points
Notes
Problems
2 Information
2.1 The Extensive Form of a Game
2.2 Information Sets
2.3 Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete Information
2.4 The Harsanyi Transformation and Bayesian Games
*2.5 Example: The Png Settlement Game
Notes
Problems
3 Continuous and Mixed Strategies
3.1 Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game
3.2 Chicken, The War of Attrition, and Correlated Strategies
3.3 Mixed Strategies with General Parameters and N Players: The
Civic Duty Game
3.4 Randomizing versus Mixing: The Auditing Game
3.5 Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game
Notes
Problems
4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
4.1 Subgame Perfectness
4.2 An Example of Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I

4.3 Credible Threats, Sunk Costs, and the Open-Set Problem in Nuisance
Suits
4.4 Recoordination to Pareto Dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto
Perfection
Notes
Problems
5 Reputation and Repeated Games
5.1 Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox
5.2 In¯nitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments, and the Folk
Theorem
5.3 Reputation: The One-Sided Prisoner's Dilemma
5.4 Product Quality in an In¯nitely Repeated Game
*5.5 Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations in Customer Switching
Costs
*5.6 Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game (formerly Section
4.6)
Notes
Problems
6 Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
6.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence II and III
6.2 Re¯ning Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: PhD Admissions
6.3 The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence IV and
V
6.4 Incomplete Information in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma: The
Gang of Four Model
6.5 The Axelrod Tournament
*6.6 Why Established Firms Pay Less for Capital: The DiamondModel
(formerly Section 15.1)
Notes
Problems
only 3 性价比很高的啊