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经济学家：贸易保护主义恐将瓦解全球供应链
2009-04-02 10:07:19
提要：本次危机与大萧条在国际贸易领域的相似之处尤其令人担忧。大萧条时期，世界贸易规模下降了四分之一。目前，本次危机还没有此类迹象，但国际贸易的下滑速度之快、范围之普遍都令人震惊。虽然还不能说世界经济又一次陷入了保护主义的恶性循环，但与大萧条时期相比，当代的保护主义更为精巧多样，而且构成了巨大威胁。大萧条的教训之一就在于，一旦贸易壁垒加强，就需要进行多年的谈判才能将其消除。与其亡羊补牢，不如预防保护主义的恶化。
（外脑精华•北京）本次危机与大萧条的对比已成为当前的热点话题，而二者在国际贸易领域的相似之处尤其令人担忧。上世纪30年代初，随着全球需求崩溃、物价暴跌、加之各国政府争相提高关税以及实施报复措施的行为导致了破坏性的保护主义恶性循环，世界贸易出现了急剧下滑。
而今，国际贸易又一次出现了萎缩，其速度之快是二战之后绝无仅有的。世贸组织最新预计，2009年的全球货物贸易总量将下降9%，这将是1982年以来全球贸易的首次下降。1990－2006年间，全球贸易年均增速超过6%，大大超过了3%的世界经济年均增速。然而，当前全球经济机器正在开倒车：世界经济正在下滑，而贸易则在以更高的速度下滑。经济风暴动摇了所有类别的产品贸易，无论是富国还是穷国买卖的产品都是如此。
贸易萎缩的直接原因很简单：全球经济衰退意味着需求滑坡，而信贷紧缩又抑制了9成世界贸易所依赖的贸易融资。据估算，贸易融资已出现了1000亿美元的缺口。
令人震惊的不仅是国际贸易的下滑速度，也在于其普遍性。世行已公布了45个经济体的1月份贸易数据。由于这些数据是以美元计算的，因此其下降的原因不仅在于贸易量的萎缩，还在于价格下跌和美元升值。45个国家之中，有37个国家的出口额同比降幅超过了四分之一。厄瓜多尔、法国、印尼、菲律宾和南非等国家虽然差异巨大，但出口降幅都不低于30%；阿根廷等初级产品出口国遭受重创，德国、日本等尖端制成品出口国也同病相怜。
保护主义依然令人担忧
目前，还不能说世界经济又一次陷入了保护主义的恶性循环。然而，政策错误却可能令坏事雪上加霜。在去年11月的20国集团峰会上，各国领导人宣称他们不会寻求保护主义措施；今年4月2日的峰会上他们同样会做出这样的承诺。但这些国家并未遵守承诺。据世行统计，自去年11月至今，20国集团中已有17个国家采取了47项贸易限制措施。
与上世纪30年代的保护主义相比，当代的保护主义更为精巧多样。大萧条时期，关税是各国最青睐的贸易武器。美国1930年批准的“斯穆特－霍利法案”共提高了近900种进口关税，而后，其贸易伙伴纷纷采取报复措施。本次危机中，不仅一些国家提高了关税，提高许可证标准、进口禁令和反倾销等措施也都有应用。富国以在财政刺激法案中包含了区别性采购条款，并向陷入困境的本国产业提供了补贴。当前的保护主义手段已多达57种。
人们有理由认为，保护主义不像过去那样令人担忧了。二战以来建立的限制关税的国际协定体系是避免全面关税战的保障。全球供应链将各国经济紧密地连接起来，使得政府难以在不伤及本国厂商的前提下提高关税。
然而，上述理由或许还不够强大。首先，多边协定基本无法防止国内补贴、加大反倾销力度或其他形式的逐步升级的保护主义措施。再则，大多数国家的关税税率都低于其对WTO承诺的最高税率，因而有能力提高关税；如果他们确实决定采取这种举措，恐怕并不会顾虑对全球供应链的影响。由于全球外包放大了提高关税的影响，因此，即使是在WTO许可的范围内，也可能造成严重的破坏。那些更为精巧的贸易保护措施也可能造成类似的影响。
国际贸易急剧下降的原因在于垂直专业化
费城联邦储备银行的经济学家Kei-Mu Yi认为，国际贸易的下降之所以如此迅猛、如此普遍，原因主要在于“垂直专业化”即全球供应链的兴起。近几十年来，全球供应链推动了贸易的迅速增长；而今，它又加快了贸易萎缩的速度。19世纪初，李嘉图提出比较优势是贸易的基础，他是指各国进行葡萄酒、布料等不同产品的专业化生产；而Kei-Mu Yi则指出，生产流程的不同环节在各国的专业化生产已经超过不同最终产品的专业化生产，成为当今国际贸易的基础。
与最终产品贸易占据主导地位的世界相比，在全球外包占据主导地位的世界中，贸易的增长速度要高得多，因为每件产品的零部件和半成品都要多次穿越国界。此外，贸易数据是以进出口总值而非净值来核算的，这个因素也增大了贸易规模。举例来说，过去，一辆美国产拖拉机的钢材和零部件都来自美国，只有在其出口时才计入贸易数据。而今，其使用的钢材可能来自印度，并在墨西哥进行加工。因此，一国需求的变化不仅会影响其本国经济，还会影响国际贸易、进而影响到多个国家的经济。
最新数据就体现了这种机制的影响。例如，Kei-Mu Yi指出，2008年10－12月的3个月之中，美国对北美自由贸易协定（NAFTA）伙伴国的汽车出口下降了20%，而对非伙伴国的出口则略有增长。其原因就在于美国对二者出口的产品结构不同：在对非伙伴国的出口中，整车占总额的四分之三；而在对NAFTA伙伴国的出口中，零部件占五分之三，这些零部件大部分最终以进口汽车的形式回到了美国。因此，美国对NAFTA国家的汽车出口在很大程度上决定于其自身的需求。
由于垂直专业化增大了贸易对生产下滑的敏感度，由此或许有助于抵御保护主义的蔓延。依赖进口投入品的制造商有可能反对提高关税，因为此举会抬高其投入品价格，从而降低本国产业的竞争力。
因此，当今的政府在以关税作为贸易武器时，对其后果的权衡势必会比过去谨慎得多。例如，NAFTA的一个项目允许一些墨西哥卡车在美国境内提供货运服务，美国暂时中止该项目后，墨西哥就提高了部分关税作为报复。但其新税率并未达到NAFTA设定的上限，而且增税产品的种类也进行了精心选择，以减轻对本国工业的危害。
垂直专业化和全球供应链令关税壁垒危害大增
然而，大量证据表明，至少发展中国家仍在大范围使用关税。世行的研究表明，在发展中国家采取的众多贸易保护措施中，提高关税约占一半的份额。由于发展中国家现行关税税率与WTO为其规定的税率之差大于发达国家，因此在不违反WTO规则的前提下，其增税空间也大于后者。
如果各国政府确实提高了关税，那么垂直供应链就会放大其影响。其原因在于，除了墨西哥的出口免税区（maquiladoras）等少数例外，关税的课税对象通常是进出口品的总价值而非本国的增加值。因此，在存在全球供应链的情况下，贸易对关税变动的反应程度会增大。
即使关税仅仅是略有上升，依然令人担忧。其原因在于，理论模型显示，只有在关税降至一定的临界值以下，垂直专业化才会启动，而国际贸易将随之突飞猛进。这意味着，贸易壁垒稍有降低，就可能导致贸易的急剧增长。同理，如果关税超过某个临界值，就可能令全球供应链瓦解，尽管此临界值可能低于WTO规则允许的上限。果真出现这种情况，那么贸易的下滑势头将比近期的暴跌更猛烈。
当然，供应链未必会如此轻易地崩溃。即使关税上升，决定供应链生存能力的其他成本却可能下降了――过去一年中，油价已带动运输成本大幅下滑。更何况，企业普遍在供应链上投入了巨资，因此不愿轻易放弃。此外，如果全球供应链存在下来，那么，到需求回暖之时，垂直专业化也有助于国际贸易的复苏。
发展中国家仍在积极运用非关税壁垒
虽然关税问题令人担忧，但各国在本次危机中动用的贸易保护手段远不仅限于此。世行记录的限制贸易措施有三分之二属于各类非关税壁垒。正如关税一样，非关税壁垒的使用者也以发展中国家为主。
印尼已规定，服装、鞋、玩具等指定类别的商品只能通过5个指定港口进口。阿根廷则取消了对汽车零部件、纺织品、电视机、玩具、鞋和皮革制品自动授予进口许可证的制度。一些国家实行了直接的进口禁令，理由往往是安全或环境方面的考虑。例如，中国已经停止进口多种欧洲产食品和饮料，其中包括爱尔兰猪肉、意大利白兰地和西班牙奶制品。意大利政府则禁止进口中国玩具。
此外，反倾销措施的运用也在增加。虽然各国在WTO发起的反倾销诉讼数量曾持续下降，但自2007年下半年起，又出现了回升。2008年的数据还不完整，但据布兰迪斯大学经济学家Chad Bown估算，反倾销诉讼的数量比2007年增长了31%。以征收附加税告终的诉讼数增长了20%。印度发起反倾销诉讼数量最多，而美国和欧盟征收反倾销税的频度最高。
发达国家青睐行业补贴
目前，富国最青睐的贸易武器既不是关税，也不是非关税进口壁垒。它们热衷于对陷入困境的本国产业、尤其是汽车制造业进行补贴。普林斯顿大学的Gene Grossman等经济学家认为，这表明全球外包已经改变了贸易保护的政治经济格局。美国汽车业不再像过去那样为直接保护而游说了，因为很大一部分增加值业务配置在国外，需要进口，而且其竞争对手是同样在美国进行整车组装的外国企业。因此，现在的汽车制造商更希望获得补贴。这样的例子在世界上有很多，不仅是美国，阿根廷、澳大利亚、巴西、英国、加拿大、中国、法国、德国、意大利和瑞典都向汽车厂商提供直接或间接补贴。据世行估算，各国决定向汽车工业提供的补贴总额达480亿美元，富国所占比重接近90%，这部分支出可以轻而易举地流入旨在刺激需求的预算方案。
此类补贴令人担忧之处在于，这可能会使生产由高效的工厂（如中东欧地区的）转向效率较低、但国家财力雄厚的富国工厂（如西欧地区的）。现在还不能判断，是否发生了这样的生产转移，但政界显然希望如此。3月19日，法国工业部长Luc Chatel声称，由于政府提供的援助，雷诺计划从斯洛文尼亚撤回部分生产，从而在巴黎附近的一家工厂创造400个工作岗位。雷诺则否认这种说法，称其在斯洛文尼亚的工厂已达到满负荷运转。
一些国际规则禁止实施扭曲市场的补贴。欧盟的一些法规限制其成员国提供政府援助，相关机构正在关注成员国援助汽车制造商的行为。美国彼得森国际经济研究所的专家Gary Hufbauer表示，美国的补贴违背了WTO规则。
多种因素助长保护主义抬头
然而，WTO的反补贴诉讼程序颇为复杂。某国要成功地提起诉讼，就必须证明他国的某项补贴符合若干标准。而且，各国政府还要权衡“贼喊捉贼”的利弊：如果某国对本国产业进行补贴，并不妨碍其起诉别国的补贴，但如果因此而掀起贸易战，自身的补贴就有可能成为别国反击的对象。这种不确定性恰恰增大了补贴的吸引力。各国政府可以在援助本国汽车厂商的同时，指责别国的保护主义举措。
各国看似无力协调财政刺激计划的局面也助长了保护主义。一些国家不愿扩大预算，新增需求外流，令外国人成为受益者。为了避免这种情况，一些政府在财政刺激方案中加入了区别性条款，最突出的例子就是“购买美国货”的采购规定。在其他国家提出抗议或威胁进行报复之后，此类措施才有所收敛。如果各国能够加强财政扩张计划的协调，就会减轻政府对于需求外流的担忧，因为所有其他国家的需求也会外流，因此各国都将受益于别国的新增支出。
各国领导人应共同预防保护主义恶化
那么，世界领导人应如何遏制损害世界经济纽带的保护主义？二十国集团峰会的空洞宣言几乎毫无意义。困难在于针对各国在本次危机中运用的各种保护主义措施，制定全面、具体且能够奏效的方案，并尽快将其付诸实施，以维持开放贸易的运转。
很多人认为，领导人最重要的任务在于承诺迅速完成屡屡陷入僵局的多哈回合贸易谈判。首先，降低关税上限将限制各国提高关税的能力。而且，力度不断增大的农产品出口补贴将被禁止。最重要的是，多哈回合的完成将是各国承诺巩固并加强二战以来开放贸易成果的、最为明确的证据。
一些经济学家不同意这种观点。例如，世行的Aaditya Mattoo和彼得森研究所的Arvind Subramanian认为，世界经济的现状意味着，多哈回合的目标不切实际，因为它企图在政治力量的反对下，为富国的制成品打开市场。他们还指出，多哈回合不会限制一些最令人担忧的非关税保护措施，如“购买美国货”条款或对衰败行业的补贴。Mattoo和Subramanian认为，应启动新一轮命名为“危机回合”的贸易谈判，WTO成员国在谈判中的首要任务是停止一切形式的保护主义行为。
还有一些经济学家也有类似提议，但Mattoo和Subramanian提出，为了给各国政府提供同意该方案的政治理由，应允许他们在本次危机期间暂停进一步的贸易自由化措施。这样，各国将启动新一轮贸易谈判，以解决当前最紧迫的保护主义问题。
然而，对于另一轮贸易谈判，各国恐怕兴趣不大。即使“危机回合”的谈判日程比显然不切实际的多哈回合更为现实，也难以保证谈判能够迅速完成，从而制止全球贸易的滑坡。
无论经济学界如何看待多哈回合或“危机回合”的设想，其中大多数人都不会否认，仅有反对保护主义的简单承诺是不够的。对各国政府而言，良好的开端应该是，二十国集团领导人拟定除关税和出口补贴之外的保护主义措施的详细名单。而后，他们可以达成共识，除了已有的措施外，不再采取新的保护主义措施。
下一步，领导人应在财政政策协调方面达成共识，这非常有助于增强上一步的可信度，因为这将缓解人们对于需求外流的担忧。最后，应授权WTO公开违背协定者名单，这可能会促使企图违背承诺的领导人三思而行。
大萧条时期，世界贸易规模下降了四分之一。目前，本次危机还没有此类迹象。然而，这场四分之三个世纪之前的世界经济萧条的教训之一就在于，一旦贸易壁垒加强，就需要进行多年的谈判才能将其消除。与其亡羊补牢，不如预防保护主义的恶化。而且，尽管可以排除发生全面贸易战的可能性，但却不能排除全球贸易死于保护主义“凌迟”的可能性。众多贸易保护措施的破坏性可能不亚于保护主义的严重恶化。而且，到全球需求最终复苏之时，开放的贸易体系能够支持世界经济实现更迅速的复苏。
英文原文：The nuts and bolts come apart
As global demand contracts, trade is slumping and protectionism rising
COMPARISONS to the Depression feature in almost every discussion of the global economic crisis. In world trade, such parallels are especially chilling. Trade declined alarmingly in the early 1930s as global demand imploded, prices collapsed and governments embarked on a destructive, protectionist spiral of higher tariffs and retaliation.
Trade is contracting again, at a rate unmatched in the post-war period. This week the World Trade Organisation （WTO） predicted that the volume of global merchandise trade would shrink by 9% this year. This will be the first fall in trade flows since 1982. Between 1990 and 2006 trade volumes grew by more than 6% a year, easily outstripping the growth rate of world output, which was about 3% （see chart 1）. Now the global economic machine has gone into reverse: output is declining and trade is tumbling at a faster pace. The turmoil has shaken commerce in goods of all sorts, bought and sold by rich and poor countries alike.
It is too soon to talk of a new protectionist spiral. Nevertheless, errors of policy risk making a bad thing worse－despite politicians’ promises to keep markets open. When they met in November, the leaders of the G20 rich and emerging economies declared that they would eschew protectionism and will doubtless do so again when they meet on April 2nd. But this pledge has not been honoured. According to the World Bank, 17 members of the group have taken a total of 47 trade-restricting steps since November.
Modern protectionism is more subtle and varied than the 1930s version. In the Depression tariffs were the weapon of choice. America’s Smoot-Hawley act, passed in 1930, increased nearly 900 American import duties－which were already high by today’s standards－and provoked widespread retaliation from America’s trading partners. A few tariffs have been raised this time, but tighter licensing requirements, import bans and anti-dumping （imposing extra duties on goods supposedly dumped at below cost by exporters） have also been used. Rich countries have included discriminatory procurement provisions in their fiscal-stimulus bills and offered subsidies to ailing national industries. These days, protectionism comes in 57 varieties.
There are good reasons for thinking that the world has less to fear from protectionism than in the past. International agreements to limit tariffs, built over the post-war decades, are a safeguard against all-out tariff wars. The growth of global supply chains, which have bound national economies together tightly, have made it more difficult for governments to increase tariffs without harming producers in their own countries.
But these defences may not be strong enough. Multilateral agreements provide little insurance against domestic subsidies, fiercer use of anti-dumping or the other forms of creeping protection. Most countries are able to raise tariffs, because their applied rates are below the maximum allowed by their WTO commitments. They may choose to do so despite the possible disruption to global supply chains. And because global sourcing amplifies the effect of tariff rises, even action that is permissible under WTO rules could cause a lot of damage. The subtler variants of protection may be similarly disruptive.
The gears of globalisation
The immediate cause of shrinking trade is plain: global recession means a collapse in demand. The credit crunch adds an additional squeeze, thanks to an estimated shortfall of $100 billion in trade finance, which lubricates 90% of world trade.
Just as striking as the speed of the downturn in trade is its indiscriminate nature. The World Bank has January trade data for 45 countries （available figures for G20 countries are shown in chart 2）. These are values, expressed in American dollars, and so have been depressed not only by lower volumes but also by falling prices and a stronger dollar. The exports of 37 of these 45 countries were more than a quarter lower than in January 2008. Countries as diverse as Ecuador, France, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Africa saw exports drop by 30% or more. Commodity exporters, such as Argentina, have suffered with sellers of sophisticated manufactures, such as Germany and Japan.
Kei-Mu Yi, an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, argues that trade has fallen so fast and so uniformly around the world largely because of the rise of "vertical specialisation", or global supply chains. This contributed to trade's rapid expansion in recent decades. Now it is adding to the rate of shrinkage. When David Ricardo argued in the early 19th century that comparative advantage was the basis of trade, he conceived of countries specialising in products, like wine or cloth. But Mr Yi points out that countries now specialise not so much in final products as in steps in the process of production.
Trade grows much faster in a world with global sourcing than in a world of trade in finished goods because components and part-finished items have to cross borders several times. The trade figures are also boosted by the practice of measuring the gross value of imports and exports rather than their net value. For example, a tractor made in America would once have been made from American steel and parts; it would have touched the trade data only if it was exported. Now, it may contain steel from India, and be stamped and pressed in Mexico, before being sold abroad. As a result, changes in demand in one country now affect not just the domestic economy but also the trade flows and economies of several countries.
This mechanism can be seen at work in recent data－for instance, says Mr Yi, in American automotive-trade figures for the last three months of 2008. Imports from everywhere fell by about 20%. On the export side, sales to America’s partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement （NAFTA） fell by 20% whereas those to non-NAFTA countries rose slightly. This, he argues, is because three-quarters of exports to non-NAFTA countries consist of finished vehicles, whereas 60% of exports to NAFTA partners consist of parts and components, most of which return to the United States embodied in imported vehicles. So American exports to other NAFTA countries are to a large extent determined by America's own demand for cars.
By making trade flows more sensitive to falls in output, vertical specialisation may provide some insurance against widespread protectionism. Manufacturers that rely on imported inputs may resist higher tariffs because they push up the prices of those inputs, making domestic industry less competitive.
Governments using tariffs as trade weapons now have to calculate the consequences far more carefully. This is borne out, for example, by Mexico's response this month to the suspension by America of a NAFTA programme that allowed some Mexican truckers to carry goods north of the border. Mexico raised some tariffs, but by less than NAFTA rules allowed, and chose the goods carefully in order to limit the damage to its own industries.
Nevertheless, there is plenty of evidence that developing countries, at least, continue to use tariffs extensively. In the World Bank's study, tariff increases accounted for half of the protective measures by these countries. Ecuador raised duties on 600 goods. Russia increased them on used cars. India put them up on some kinds of steel. Developing countries have more scope for raising tariffs without breaking WTO rules than richer ones do, because the gap between their applied rates and the ceilings they agreed to is greater than for developed countries.
When governments do impose tariffs, vertical supply chains amplify their effects. Because tariffs are typically levied on the gross value crossing the border （with some exceptions, such as exports from Mexican maquiladoras）, trade responds more to changes in tariffs－down or up－with global supply chains than without.
But there is another, more subtle reason to worry about even small rises in tariffs. Theoretical models that incorporate vertical specialisation find that it takes off only when tariffs fall below a threshold level. Once this happens, however, trade explodes, so that a slight lowering of trade barriers can cause a huge increase in trade. By the same token, if tariffs rose above a certain point－which might be below the maximum agreed on at the WTO－global supply chains would disintegrate. Trade would drop even more steeply than it has in recent months.
That said, supply chains need not snap so easily. Even if tariffs go up, other costs that determine the viability of supply chains may go down: the price of oil （and hence the cost of transport） has fallen a long way in the past year. Firms have invested a lot in their supply chains and will be loth to abandon them. And if global supply chains do survive, vertical specialisation could help trade recover speedily when demand returns.
Although increased tariffs are a cause for concern, they are far from the only form of protection being used in this crisis. Two-thirds of the trade-restricting measures documented by the World Bank are non-tariff barriers of various kinds. As with tariffs, developing countries are the principal wielders of these weapons.
Indonesia has specified that certain categories of goods, such as clothes, shoes and toys, may be imported through only five ports. Argentina has imposed discretionary licensing requirements on car parts, textiles, televisions, toys, shoes and leather goods; licences for all these used to be granted automatically. Some countries have imposed outright import bans, often justified by a tightening of safety rules or by environmental concerns. For example, China has stopped imports of a wide range of European food and drink, including Irish pork, Italian brandy and Spanish dairy products. The Indian government has banned Chinese toys.
In addition, anti-dumping is on the increase. The number of anti-dumping cases initiated at the WTO had been declining, but it started to pick up in the second half of 2007. The data for 2008 are not yet complete but Chad Bown, an economist at Brandeis University, estimates that the number was 31% higher than in the previous year. The number of cases ending with extra duties went up by 20%. India was the biggest initiator of anti-dumping action, and America and the European Union imposed duties most frequently.
Rich countries' weapon of choice so far is neither tariffs nor non-tariff barriers to imports. They have been keen users instead of subsidies to troubled domestic industries, particularly carmakers. Some economists, such as Gene Grossman, of Princeton University, cite this as evidence that global sourcing has changed the political economy of protection. The American automotive industry no longer lobbies for direct protection, as it used to, because it imports much of its value-added and competes with foreign firms that assemble their cars in America. Carmakers now prefer explicit subsidies, and the world is replete with examples. Besides America, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, Italy and Sweden have all also provided direct or indirect subsidies to carmakers. The World Bank reckons that proposed subsidies for the car industry amount to $48 billion. Nearly 90% of this is in rich countries, where it can easily be slipped into budgetary packages to stimulate demand.
The worry about such subsidies is that they could cause production to switch from more efficient plants （eg, in central and eastern Europe） to less efficient ones in rich countries with deep pockets （eg, in western Europe）. Whether the location of output is shifting is not yet clear, but politicians plainly hope it will. On March 19th Luc Chatel, the French industry minister, boasted that Renault's plans to create 400 jobs at a factory near Paris by "repatriating" some production from Slovenia was the result of government aid. Renault has denied this, saying that it was at full capacity in Slovenia.
There are some international rules to prevent distorting subsidies. The EU has regulations to limit state aid, and is looking into its members' assistance to carmakers. Gary Hufbauer, of the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC, argues that American subsidies transgress WTO norms.
Helpful ambiguity
However, WTO action against subsidies is not straightforward. To complain successfully, a country has to show that a subsidy meets several criteria. Then there is a pots-and-kettles problem: having subsidies of your own does not stop you from challenging someone else's, but if you pick a fight they may have a go at yours. This uncertainty and ambiguity only adds to subsidies' attraction. Governments can aid their carmakers and at the same time criticise others for their protectionist ways.
Protectionist urges are also being bolstered by countries' seeming inability to co-ordinate their fiscal stimulus programmes. Some countries have been reluctant to work the budgetary pump for fear that their extra demand will leak abroad to the benefit of foreigners. To stop the seepage, some governments have inserted discriminatory conditions into their fiscal programmes, the prime example being the "Buy American" procurement rules. These were weakened after protests and threats of retaliation from abroad, but not before the prospects for global co-operation had been dented. Greater co-ordination of fiscal expansion would ease governments' worries about leakage, because everyone else would be leaking too: all would gain from each other's spending.
What should world leaders do to stop protection fraying the threads that tie the world economy together? The pious declaration at the previous G20 meeting has had little effect. There is a risk that another such promise on April 2nd will prove to be just as empty. The difficulty lies in devising something comprehensive and detailed enough to address the variety of protectionist measures that are being deployed in the crisis, and doing it quickly enough to maintain open trade.
Many argue that the most important thing for world leaders to do is to pledge a quick completion of the Doha round of trade talks, which stalled for the umpteenth time last summer. By reducing tariff ceilings, this would place tighter limits on countries' ability to increase tariffs. It would also ban export subsidies in agriculture, which are being used with greater vigour, especially as prices of farm goods fall. The EU, for example, has announced new export subsidies for butter, cheese and milk powder. Most important, completing Doha would be the clearest and most tangible evidence possible of a commitment to consolidating and building on the gains from more open trade secured in successive rounds since the second world war.
Some economists disagree. Aaditya Mattoo, of the World Bank, and Arvind Subramanian, of the Peterson Institute, argue that the Doha round is too ambitious given the state of the world economy, because it seeks to open markets for rich countries' manufactured goods just when the politics are against it. At the same time, they point out that Doha would not restrict the use of some non-tariff measures causing most concern, such as the Buy American provisions or subsidies for failing industries. Messrs Mattoo and Subramanian suggest a new "crisis round" of world trade talks. In the first instance, WTO members could commit themselves to a standstill on all forms of protectionism.
Several other economists have also proposed a standstill. However, Messrs Mattoo and Subramanian suggest that in order to give governments a political reason to agree to this, they should also be allowed to postpone further liberalisation for the duration of the crisis. They would then embark on a new round instead of Doha, which would address the forms of protection that now look most pressing.
But the appetite for starting yet another series of talks is likely to be limited. Even if the crisis round’s agenda were more realistic than Doha’s （which isn’t obvious）, there would be no guarantee that it could be concluded quickly enough to stop the bleeding in global trade.
Whatever they think about Doha or about the idea of a crisis round, most economists will agree that a simple promise to resist protectionism will not suffice. Some thing more specific is needed. A good start would be for governments, beginning with the leaders of the G20, to draw up a comprehensive list of protectionist measures that goes beyond tariffs and export subsidies. They could then agree to go no further with these than they have already.
Next, an agreement on co-ordinating fiscal policy would go a long way towards making such a standstill commitment credible, because it would alleviate worries about leakages abroad. Finally, empowering the WTO to name those who break the standstill would help to underpin it. The threat of embarrassment may make some countries think twice.
During the Depression, the volume of world trade shrank by a quarter. Nothing like that has been seen or forecast so far. Yet one lesson from the worldwide economic distress of three-quarters of a century ago is that once trade barriers come up, they take years of negotiation to dismantle. Preventing protectionism from getting worse is preferable to having to repair the damage afterwards. And even if a full-blown trade war can be ruled out, death by a thousand cuts cannot. The costs of myriad piecemeal measures could still add up to damaging protectionism. And when demand does eventually revive, if the world economy is supported by an open system of trade, it will recover all the faster.
来源：经济学家，2009.03.26
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