楼主: 闲人
11041 14

[行为经济学] 哈佛大学经济学系行为学教授 [推广有奖]

  • 0关注
  • 23粉丝

贵宾

东厂厂长(国务院副总理级)

院士

90%

还不是VIP/贵宾

-

威望
8
论坛币
167771 个
通用积分
14.5960
学术水平
64 点
热心指数
82 点
信用等级
37 点
经验
7325 点
帖子
1775
精华
28
在线时间
30 小时
注册时间
2004-6-2
最后登录
2021-5-5

相似文件 换一批

+2 论坛币
k人 参与回答

经管之家送您一份

应届毕业生专属福利!

求职就业群
赵安豆老师微信:zhaoandou666

经管之家联合CDA

送您一个全额奖学金名额~ !

感谢您参与论坛问题回答

经管之家送您两个论坛币!

+2 论坛币

哈佛大学经济学系经过Roth, Laibson and Shlaifer等人的努力,已经成为行为经济学研究的重镇,其博士毕业生也非常抢手,这几年一流大学新招的微观领域的教授很多来自哈佛。说明哈佛的行为经济学的影响力日益强大。在哈佛,研究行为经济学已经成为非常主流的博士论文选题。

特别是最近两三年还引进了一些年轻的行为经济学学者,进一步加强了这方面的实力,并且还把伯克利的Rabin请来开设课程和客座研究,对这股热潮推波助澜。可以预见,哈佛经济学系的这种努力对整个微观经济学的革新将是有深远影响。

现在把新的哈佛经济学系相关教授的间接再一次上传,以引起行为经济学爱好者的兴趣,并从中获得动力

头一个就传一位美女经济学家,这使得大家都明白,不仅哈佛经济学系中有出色的美丽的行为经济学博士候选人,而且还有同样出色美丽的行为经济学教授

Assistant Professor Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln Ph.D. Yale Primary fields of interest: Macroeconomics, international economics, and behavioral economics. Research Topics: Household consumption and savings behavior, heterogeneous preferences and self-selection.

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fuchs/fuchs.html

document.body.clientWidth*0.5) {this.resized=true;this.width=document.body.clientWidth*0.5;this.style.cursor='pointer';} else {this.onclick=null}" alt="" />

[此贴子已经被作者于2004-10-22 8:51:47编辑过]

二维码

扫码加我 拉你入群

请注明:姓名-公司-职位

以便审核进群资格,未注明则拒绝

关键词:哈佛大学 经济学 行为学 Preferences consumption 经济学 哈佛大学 行为 教授

面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!
沙发
闲人 发表于 2004-10-22 08:43:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

Professor Edward L. Glaeser Ph.D. University of Chicago Primary fields of interest: Urban economics, social economics, institutions.

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/glaeser/glaeser.html

Professor David I. Laibson Ph.D. MIT Primary fields of interest: Macroeconomics (particularly consumption and savings), intertemporal choice, psychology, experimental economics. Research Topics:

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/laibson/laibson.html
面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!

使用道具

藤椅
闲人 发表于 2004-10-22 08:43:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

Professor Sendhil Mullainathan Ph.D. Harvard Primary fields of interest: Psychology and economics, poverty, and finance. Research Topics:

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/mullainathan/mullainathan.html

Professor Alvin E. Roth Ph.D. Stanford Primary fields of interest: Game theory as a part of empirical economics, and experimental economics theory. Research Topics: Organization of labor (and other) markets, bargaining, learning in strategic environments.

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/aroth/
面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!

使用道具

板凳
闲人 发表于 2004-10-22 08:44:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群
Professor Andrei Shleifer Ph.D. MIT Primary fields of interest: Applied theory, corporate finance, economic transition. Research Topics: Transition to market economy in Russia, corporate law and finance.

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/shleifer.html

Professor Jeremy C. Stein Ph.D. MIT Primary fields of interest: Corporate finance, behavioral finance, money and banking. Research Topics: Capital allocation inside firms, asset pricing with differences of opinion, the role of banks in the transmission of monetary policy.

http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/stein/stein.html

面对渐渐忘却历史的人们,我一直尽力呼喊!

使用道具

报纸
midi51 发表于 2004-10-24 19:17:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln 也能说的上是美丽吗? 呵呵。。。。。 典型的北欧女人,看了看国籍果然是德国的。

不过YALE近几年的Graduate Placement真是好的让人吃惊,04年HARVARD就要了2个,另一个是Matthias Schuendeln。 看名字和Nicola Fuchs-Schuendeln 有一定的关系。

印度裔经济学家Sendhil Mullainathan今年秋季刚从MIT回到母校HARVARD,此君98年毕业,6年不到的时间在MIT已经做到副教授,今年秋季又得到了HARVARD正教授的职位,也算是火箭速度了。

Education

HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE, MA, 1993-1998 PhD in Economics Dissertation Topic: Essays in Applied Microeconomics Advisors: Drew Fudenberg, Lawrence Katz, and Andrei Shleifer

CORNELL UNIVERSITY, ITHACA, NY, 1990-1993 B.A. in Computer Science, Economics, and Mathematics, magna cum laude

使用道具

地板
midi51 发表于 2004-10-24 19:20:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

搜“David I. Laibson ” 还竟然看到了下面这样一个网页,够搞笑的。。。

http://book.sina.com.cn/longbook/1082430743_liuyiting2/15.shtml

我进哈佛读书时,正赶上美国“重塑本科教育”改革进行到第3个年头,哈佛的本科生 得到了比过去更多的重视,有很多机会由著名教授直接给我们上课(美国本科生的父母很重 视孩子和教授接触的机会多不多)。我选课的时候也优先选那些著名教授的课。

  哈佛教授通常每年教一门本科生的课,教一门研究生的课,有时也可因研究课题的需要 申请暂停授课。因此,有些好课并非每届学生都有缘遇到。大二下学期选课时,我发现新开 了一门我很喜欢的课:“经济心理学”,授课的是该领域的两位著名教授安德雷?施莱佛( Andrei Shleifer)和戴维?雷伯森(David I. Laibson)。从介绍来看,上这门课需要具 备一些我还没学过的金融专业知识,但从课程的时间预告来看,我在哈佛的4年中,可能只 有大二下学期能遇到开这门课。如果我不抓住机会,“过了这个村就没这个店了”,多可惜 呀!好在哈佛是自由选课制,没有让我留下遗憾。开课后我才发现,这门课的同学大都是大 四的学生。

  我选的16门专业课也很有吸引力。这些课程意在培养学生用数学方法分析解决经济问题 的能力,非常实用。我在哈佛打过的几份工,基本上都和专业课培养的能力有关,尤其是经 济学本科最难的3门课——资本市场、公司财务、金融经济学课题——培养的能力。

  “资本市场”课的内容有:金融市场和投资策略的分析、期权定价理论、市场效率、风 险管理、套利理论、各种金融工具(如债券、股票)和衍生金融工具等。掌握这方面的知识 可使学生对资本市场的各种现象及未来发展趋势有所认识。

  “公司财务”课的内容有:资本预算、公司的资本结构、股利政策、内部激励机制、清 算等。掌握这方面的知识,是为了实现企业价值最大化。这门课是微观金融学的核心课程, 应用性强,重在实用,采用的是商学院的案例教学法。

  “金融经济学课题”研究性很强,是经济学本科难度之最。内容涉及:金融经济学的理 论与实践的选题、财务行为和市场效率、资本市场和公司内部的资金配置、银行业务和货币 政策等。重点是研究前沿性课题,如:大企业老总的报酬设计是否合理?为什么公司爱以期 权计酬而不愿以股票付酬?……(顺便说一句,西方经济学者习惯于研究非常具体的课题, 讲究“务实不务虚”)考查探讨这些课题,目的是使学生在掌握分析技能的同时,具备独立 分析和解释金融活动和金融现象的能力。上课方式是教授讲一个现象,和学生一起分析讨论 ,不仅研究现象,还研究如何印证观点,如何收集数据等等。

  哈佛的经济学课程融进了多项20世纪90年代获得诺贝尔经济学奖的研究成果,涉及到当 前经济生活中的诸多热点,学起来感觉很爽!

使用道具

7
midi51 发表于 2004-10-24 19:30:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

http://www.harvardmagazine.com/on-line/0901212.html

Endorphin Rush: PricelessPurse Strings of the Heart

Odysseus struggled to resist the Sirens. Adam Smith warned of dangerous passions for profusion. And we have all, despite our diets, succumbed to that beckoning slice of pie. The desire for instant gratification can run roughshod over our best intentions. Finally, contemporary economists are catching on. After centuries of basing their assumptions on the premise that people act rationally, they are now acknowledging that psychological variables like self-control (or lack thereof) profoundly influence economic behavior.

"Economists had looked for the simplest model, purged of the psychological stuff. That was considered auxiliary," says Sack associate professor of political economy David I. Laibson '88. Now the burgeoning discipline of "behavioral economics" brings emotional factors into economic models. In Laibson's hands, this behavioral approach outdoes traditional models--especially when accounting for apparently irrational phenomena among consumers like debilitating credit-card debt.

The traditional economic model, extrapolating from the rational "economic man," predicts an average household debt of $900. In fact, according to Federal Reserve data, the average American household owes $4,600 on credit cards, often at interest rates of 18 percent or even higher. Meanwhile, many of the same people hold investments earning well under 10 percent. While they may have logical reasons for their behavior, it seems irrational. But to Laibson, credit-card borrowing is no surprise. His behavioral model, which applies "hyperbolic discounting," expects a debt of $3,408.

Laibson has advanced the theory of hyperbolic discounting in a recent series of papers. In a simple illustration, most of us prefer one apple today over two apples tomorrow. But at some point on the time horizon, our preferences reverse: people prefer two apples in 100 days to one apple in 99 days. The difference in one apple's value between today and tomorrow is much greater than the difference between waiting 99 days and waiting a hundred. Hyperbolic discounting means that our discount rates (the values we personally assign to an object like an apple) do not remain constant, but are greater in the short run than the long run. Hence consumers are willing to pay exorbitant interest rates on credit-card debt while earning much smaller returns on long-run illiquid investments.

In his credit-card research, Laibson did not directly confront consumers about their spending habits, but rather constructed mathematical formulas that could reasonably approximate existing empirical data. His formulas simulate consumer spending and saving patterns; Laibson tries to create the best match between the simulated data and reality. Unlike traditional models, Laibson's formulas include variables for credit-card debt, changing household size, and illiquid assets. But the most striking difference is the assumption of hyperbolic discounting. By factoring in a discount rate that declines at different rates over time, Laibson captures the self-control problem in mathematical form.

Laibson's research grows out of a seminal 1956 article by Robert H. Strotz, the revered bellwether of behavioral economics. Strotz's observations on myopia (the inconsistencies between our short- and long-run behavior) inspired Laibson to consider consumers' breakdowns of self-control. Traditional economics, for example, postulates that future intentions accurately predict future behavior: if we plan to save $1,000 by December, we will save $1,000 by December. But while intending to save, we simultaneously crave instant gratification--and achieve this by spending our income now. When the "future" becomes the present, our cravings rule.

"We plan to cut back on sweets tomorrow," Laibson says, "and then tomorrow we're given a slice of chocolate cake and we say, 'Well, just this one piece'"--so we revise our plan and decide to start the following day. This drive for instant gratification, he says, entices households to spend their cash (or liquid wealth), as well as to borrow aggressively on credit cards.

Although consumers like to spend in the short run, they also strive to build illiquid wealth, such as investments in homes and 401(k) programs which provide substantial long-run returns. "We find that households are patient in the long run, and impatient in the short run," Laibson says. "They are dynamically inconsistent."

This notion of conflicting preferences--choosing to act both patiently and impatiently--challenges traditional economics, which posits unified, consistent preferences and assumes that psychological factors are too complex to formalize into models. But Laibson argues that consumers are complicated, and that purely rational models overlook basic elements of behavior in the marketplace. In his research, he assumes that people are sophisticated enough to acknowledge their inconsistencies. "Consumers correctly predict that later selves will not honor the preference of early selves," he argues. Consequently, people adopt various strategies to save for the future. By investing heavily in assets that are difficult and costly to sell, such as homes, consumers tie up their money to forestall splurging. Illiquid assets are bulwarks against eroding will power; they are commitment devices, like scheduling a 9 a.m. appointment to keep from sleeping late--Laibson's personal technique.

"We'll never achieve a perfect model. That would be the world itself," Laibson says. "But we can build richer and richer systems to make better and better approximations of reality."

~Catherine Dupree

使用道具

8
midi51 发表于 2004-10-24 19:35:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

http://www.fundadvice.com/FEhtml/PsychHurdles/0206b.html

Lessons Learned at Harvard: Easy Solutions to Baffling Problems

by Paul A. Merriman Publisher and Editor

Late in April I had the privilege of taking part in the Sixth Conference on the Psychology of Investing at Harvard University. It left me feeling more convinced than ever of how important it is for investors to follow something other than their emotions.

This conference focused on the emotional hurdles of real-life investing. That’s my specialty, and I want to share with FundAdvice.com readers a lot of the things I learned. Consider this article a “down payment” on that promise, and watch for more insights in future articles later this year.

ULTIMATELY, MOST AMERICANS ARE NEARLY BROKE WHEN THEY RETIRE.

The conference participants included authors, money managers, academics and one of the nation’s most respected futurists. Their experience and research indicate that investors are often their own worst enemies.

I’d like to start by summarizing some of the ways that happens, based on research described by David I. Laibson, a Harvard economics professor.

Most people don’t save enough money. A survey in 1997 by Public Agenda, a nonpartisan opinion research organization in New York, found that 76 percent of the respondents believed they should be saving more money for retirement. Among those who said they believed they should be “seriously saving” for retirement, only 6 percent said they were ahead of where they should be in their plans, while 55 percent said they were behind where they ought to be. People’s financial habits are counter-productive. Here’s one example: One-third of participants in 401(k) programs are currently borrowing against their retirement savings. This debt is often described as benign because the required interest payments are made “to yourself.” But in fact, these loans carry very high risks. If the borrower changes jobs, is laid off or for any other reason stops participating in the 401(k) plan, the full balance of the loan is due immediately. Any part of the loan that is not paid off is treated by the IRS as a withdrawal subject to taxes and (except for employees who are 59½ or older) a 10 percent penalty for early withdrawal. Worse, I don’t think the majority of 401(k) borrowers understand this risk. People’s financial habits are counter-productive, Part II. Average credit card debt per household is $8,000. The average interest rate on this debt is 16 percent. Typical credit card agreements require 2 percent of the balance to be paid each month (or $20, whichever is less). Even if a household stopped making any new charges, paying off an $8,000 balance by making the minimum payments while incurring interest of 16 percent, would take more than 31 years. And in the process, that household would pay total interest of $14,104.

Ultimately, most people are nearly broke when they retire. The median U.S. household (median means half are above this figure, half are below) retires with liquid wealth of $15,000 and a net worth of $130,000. Most of that net worth is in home equity and vehicles.

All this is very sobering to anyone dedicated to helping other people help themselves.

Why does this happen on such a large scale among a population that’s one of the best-educated and most privileged in the world?

Irrational behavior

Dr. Laibson believes Americans are irrational, have only weak self-control and we are unrealistically and bountifully optimistic. I think there’s a fourth factor at work: Too many Americans are passive and just don’t want to be bothered.

Laibson says mainstream economists assume (incorrectly) that American consumers are rational beings. You can hear this assumption often in newscasts that attempt to explain economic behavior of all sorts: “In response to the deteriorating demand for labor, Americans tightened their belts and deferred purchases of durable goods.” This sounds wonderful in theory. But do you know anybody who decides whether to buy a new washing machine on the basis of economic statistics?

On the other hand, behavioral economists – and Laibson counts himself among them – believe that consumers have a lot to learn. Laibson cited a study by the U.S. Department of Education that found among a group of men and women 21 to 25 years old that:

Only 40 percent could calculate the change due to a customer after a purchase of two items. Only 20 percent could accurately read and interpret a bus schedule.

How many of these young people do you suppose can read and understand the Wall Street Journal?

Obviously, most young people don’t have a lot of incentive to learn to make change and figure out bus schedules. But even when the stakes are high, most people don’t seem to have a lot of motivation. Less than a third of Americans who are over 26 years old and have not yet retired have tried to figure out how much savings they will need in order to live comfortably in retirement.

401(k) follies

But what about people who invest regularly? Surely they must be more sophisticated about finances.

Laibson and other researchers wanted to test that notion, and they figured that an excellent way to do so is to monitor how people manage their 401(k) investments. Most such accounts give employees a range of choices so they can allocate their money between stocks, bonds and cash or the equivalent.

Investment advisors and financial columnists pay a lot of attention to how 401(k) money should be invested. But the research suggests a lot of employees don’t care very much. Laibson described a study in which employees were told how, on average, their fellow 401(k) participants had allocated their assets. Most of the workers in the study said they thought the average allocation of other workers was better than their own.

Other research indicates many employees believe all plan options are of equal value. If a plan has three stock funds and one bond fund, participants’ average allocations are typically 75 percent in equities. If a plan has only one stock fund and three bond funds, average allocations are typically only 25 percent in equities. This is not what I would call the behavior of savvy investors.

A survey of retirement plan participants by John Hancock found a startling level of ignorance. Nearly half (47 percent) believed that money-market funds are made up partly of stocks. About the same number (49 percent) thought money market funds are made up partly of bonds. Only 9 percent knew the truth: Money-market funds contain only short-term fixed-income securities.

That survey also found that only one of every four participants understood the inverse relationship between interest rates and bond prices – that when interest rates rise, bonds lose value. That is very important information for any bond investor to know, especially these days. (I am certain that after a few months of rising interest rates and falling bond prices, I’ll start hearing from investors who have no clue about what has happened to the bond funds they thought were so safe.)

Laibson cited research about taxable accounts as well. He said a typical investor with taxable assets loses three percentage points of return each year in tax payments and unnecessary transaction costs: 2 percent to taxes and 1 percent more than necessary in mutual fund management fees. Load fund investors, of course, pay much more for the privilege of owning funds.

This casual approach is enormously expensive. Laibson cited the cost of losing 3 percentage points of investment returns over 40 years. “If I invest $100,000 for 40 years, a 10 percent return per year will generate a balance of $4.5 million. If I invest $100,000 for 40 years, a 7 percent return per year will generate a balance of $1.5 million.”

“Mainstream” economists believe that consumers make careful plans and carry them out. This assumption is very convenient in an ivory tower, as it gives academics an easy tool to explain behavior. If consumers do a certain thing, that must mean they were planning to do it.

But Laibson thinks that’s a myth. Many consumers make plans. But they aren’t at all diligent about carrying them out. Instead, they give in to temptation. Laibson says Americans are so eager for instant gratification that over and over they short-change themselves. He cited a simple question that researchers often ask subjects during meetings, classes and workshops: Which would you prefer, a 15-minute break today or a 30-minute break tomorrow? Time after time, 15 minutes today is perceived as more valuable than 30 minutes tomorrow.

Here’s an interesting variation: Which would you prefer, a 15-minute break 100 days from now or a 30-minute break 101 days from now? In this case, people seem very willing to wait another day in order to get a longer break – you may have had the same immediate reaction yourself.

But in fact, the choice in these two questions is actually exactly the same: a 15-minute break one day or a 30-minute break one day later.

Overheard in the subway

I once overheard a form of this in what may be an unusually philosophical conversation between two teenage girls on a subway train in New York City. Girl A: “Would you rather be beautiful now, knowing you would gradually get ugly in later life, or would you rather be ugly now and know that you’d be beautiful later?” Girl B: “That’s easy. I’d be beautiful now.”

We make long-term plans, then undermine them with our short-term actions. For the long term, we intend to be patient and delay our gratification. We’ll quit smoking, start exercising, lose weight. Financial planners advise their clients to “save early and save often.” Baby boomers say they want to save 15 percent of their incomes.

But real life seems to get in the way. The actual median savings rate is 5 percent. The average smoker has tried to quit four times. The typical employee procrastinates about two years before enrolling in a 401(k) plan after it is offered or after the employee becomes eligible.

In a survey of 100 workers in a large company, 68 said they were saving too little money. Of those 68, 24 said they planned to increase their savings rate within three months. After three months, only three of the 68 actually did so.

MOST 401(K) PARTICIPANTS CHOSE WHATEVER INVESTMENT OPTIONS WERE THE EASIEST

Two professors found that the average cost of a one-month membership to a health club was $75. On average, members visited their clubs four times a month, meaning they were willing to pay $19 per visit. The same clubs on average charged $10 per session for pay-per-visit memberships.

Americans hold about 10 million “Christmas Club” accounts at banks, thrift institutions and credit unions. These accounts pay no interest, but they are popular because they build savings through automatic deposits from checking accounts – and even from interest-paying savings accounts.

Similarly, the majority of U.S. taxpayers get IRS refunds every year, through excess withholding from their paychecks. Workers like this “forced” savings because the money is automatically taken from their pay before it can be spent.

Garrison Keillor: “In Lake Wobegone, we believe in salting money away, not only as an investment but also to remove it as a temptation.”

Everybody’s above average

In that respect, consumers’ beliefs appear to reflect reality. But many behavioral economists, including Laibson, believe that consumers wear rose-colored glasses. We tend to be so optimistic that we fool ourselves.

When asked to compare themselves with their peers, research subjects almost always report a self-enhancing bias that reminds one of Lake Wobegone, “where all the children are above average.”

Relative to their peers, research subjects reported that in comparison to the general population, they were more intelligent, more likely to succeed at work, more likely to enjoy their job and more likely to have good marriages.

These researchers must love their jobs, since they get to meet such outstanding people!

The list goes on, with subjects reporting that compared to others they are more likely to own homes that appreciate, more likely to live beyond age 80 and more likely to make money in the stock market. In one study, 70 percent of the subjects reported that they were safer drivers than most of the population.

What Laibson calls “unbounded optimism” leads to unrealistic expectations. In 1998, the average investor expected the stock market to continue to grow 20 percent a year for the next decade. A common attitude among young people is: “My financial situation will improve in the future, so I don’t need to start saving now. I’ll do it later.”

Another case study done by Laibson and three other researchers makes me wonder how many workers even care about their 401(k) savings. The study tracked the behavior of employees in two companies that switched their 401(k) signup procedures.

In the first company, before the change, new employees could choose to sign up for the program by checking a box on a form. If they didn’t check the box, they did not participate. Only about 30 percent of the employees in the company signed up.

Then this company made a change. Now, every employee that was not in the plan was given a choice to stay out of it. But unless they actively chose against participation, they were automatically signed up. After the change, about 90 percent of the employees were in the plan.

The great majority of employees in this company took the easiest course (not checking a box), whether that resulted in not participating (before the change) or in participating (after the change). Whatever was easiest, that’s what most of them did.

INVESTORS ARE TOO OPTIMISTIC. THEY HAVE TOO LITTLE SELF DISCIPLINE. AND THEY MAKE NON-RATIONAL DECISIONS

After the change, the workers who were new to the plan could specify what percentage of their pay was saved, and how it was allocated among various investment choices. But if they didn’t check other boxes on the form, they were given the “default” arrangement of 2 percent contribution, all of it going into a money-market fund. About two-thirds of the new participants chose the default allocation, a money-market fund – a pretty poor choice for most people in a 401(k) plan.

The second company in this study, before it made a change, also allowed new employees to sign up for the plan – and those who didn’t sign up were excluded. In other words, the default choice was not to participate. Only about 30 percent of the employees had checked the box and were in the plan.

Then the company changed its forms, and all new employees had to check one box or another, to participate or not. There was no more default option. After this change, participation grew to 50 percent.

After I returned from the Harvard conference, another study of 401(k) behavior was reported that I found equally instructive.

Nebraska as a case study

The state of Nebraska did a study of its 38-year-old 401(k) system in action and pronounced it a failure, largely because of the choices made by employees. Nebraska was an innovative employer. In 1964, it started letting workers choose between staying with the state’s traditional defined-benefit pension plan or joining a new self-directed 401(k).

The state required all workers to contribute part of their pay either to the pension plan, which guaranteed retirement benefits based on salaries and length of service, or to the 401(k), which guaranteed retirees that they could direct their own courses and take their accumulated investments at retirement – while of course they received no pension.

Nebraska didn’t merely leave 401(k) participants to their own devices, as most corporate 401(k) plans do today. The state let participants take time off from work to attend daylong educational investment seminars, something that few employers do today.

Two years ago, the state studied its 401(k) system, one of the oldest in the country, and found that over the past 30 years the typical participant had an average annual return of 6 percent to 7 percent. That compared with about 11 percent annual returns that the state’s traditional pension fund managers achieved in the same time frame.

The bulk of Nebraska’s 401(k) participants did not allocate their investments successfully. Nebraska offered 11 fund choices. But 90 percent of the contributions wound up in only three funds – and half of all 401(k) money was in the default option, a low-paying guaranteed investment contract fund.

State officials began to fear they were wasting taxpayer dollars by giving matching contributions.

The result: Existing employees can stay in the 401(k) plan. But after next January, new Nebraska employees will no longer have the 401(k) plan as a choice.

Whether or not other employers follow suit, Nebraska’s experience is very sobering, especially since it spans a long time period and especially since the state went far out of its way to help employees learn to do the right things. The lesson seems to be that the majority of employees didn’t care enough to be bothered. Unfortunately, Nebraska’s experience reinforces some of the findings reported at the Harvard conference by Laibson.

Investors need an automatic pilot

At the conference, I was pleased to be able to present my answer to many of the problems that were outlined by Laibson and others. While I don’t have the academic credentials of those professors, I have a lot of hands-on experience, and I know a lot about investors and their behavior.

AUTOMATIC SAVING, AUTOMATIC TIMING AND AUTOMATIC DIVERSIFICATION ARE THE KEYS TO REAL-LIFE SUCCESS FOR MOST INVESTORS

Most of the investors I deal with are not as passive or apparently misguided as those studied by the Harvard professors. But many investors are much too optimistic. Many investors have an awful time with self-discipline. And many investors make non-rational decisions about their financial affairs. How else would you explain all the money in non-interest-bearing Christmas Club savings accounts?

Laibson offered four pieces of advice to investors: First, don’t try to pick star managers. “You won’t be the one to discover the next Warren Buffett,” he said. Instead, invest in index funds, including U.S. and international stock funds, U.S. bond funds and inflation-linked bonds. Second, don’t trade; instead, buy and hold. Third, shift your portfolio more toward bonds as you grow older. Four, avoid commission-based financial advice, which he described as “snake-oil.”

I agree with those points. But as I said in my address to the conference, they are insufficient. We already know that people who have great plans, strong intentions and clear instructions can still sabotage themselves with irrational, impulsive behavior.

Readers of this newsletter won’t be surprised at my recommendations, which appeared to impress many people at the conference. My prescriptions could be summed up in a single sentence: Make good saving and investing habits automatic.

Mechanical savings

If people lack the self discipline to set aside money every time they get paid, they can make that automatic in a variety of ways through payroll deductions or regular automatic withdrawals from their checking accounts. The money can go into a bank account, a 401(k) plan, a credit union or a mutual fund through an automatic investment plan. This is the only foolproof way to make sure you “pay yourself first.”

Mechanical diversification

No-load index funds give investors enormous diversification in cost-efficient packages. There’s no need to choose managers or pick stocks. The market does that, automatically, through index funds. These should make up the bulk of a properly diversified buy-and-hold portfolio.

Mechanical timing

I share Laibson’s view that buying and holding is far more likely to succeed than active trading. But market timing, if it is done properly, can reduce risk and improve returns over the long run. Not every investor wants or needs timing. But for those who use this approach, the only timing I practice and the only timing I advocate is mechanical timing. Mechanical systems make it unnecessary to analyze economic and market data or agonize over when to buy and when to sell. These systems are based on facts, not forecasts, and they give unambiguous buy and sell signals.

Automatic saving, automatic timing and automatic diversification can’t work miracles. They can’t make up for decades of lost time when individuals chose to spend instead of save. They can’t change the effects of bear markets.

But if they are applied with discipline and patience, they can make successful investing possible for most individuals. And they don’t require a Harvard education.

使用道具

9
midi51 发表于 2004-10-24 19:46:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

http://www.wehaitians.com/calculating%20the%20irrational%20in%20economics.html

Calculating the Irrational in Economics

By STEPHEN J. DUBNER

WHEN the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston invited the leading behavioral economists to a Cape Cod golf resort this month to make their case, it was plainly a signal moment. "It has the feeling of being summoned by the king," said Colin F. Camerer, a star behaviorist who teaches at the California Institute of Technology. "Sort of like: `I understand you're the finest lute player in the region. Will you come and play for me?' "

Until the last few years, behavioral economics — which blends psychology, economics and, increasingly, neuroscience to argue that emotion plays a huge role in how people make economic decisions — was an extremely tight-knit group. It had little influence and few practitioners. One economist at the bank's conference recalled an Alaska kayaking trip that Mr. Camerer took with another prominent behaviorist a decade ago. "If that kayak had flipped," he said, "half the field would have been eradicated."

But the field has grown, as has its influence. In 1996, Alan Greenspan's warning of "irrational exuberance" acknowledged, as the behaviorists do, that the average investor is hardly the superrational "homo economicus" that mainstream economists depict. In 2001, the young behaviorist Matthew Rabin won the John Bates Clark Medal; last fall, the psychologist Daniel Kahneman, a forefather of behavioral economics, was awarded the Nobel in economic science.

And so it was that the Boston Fed summoned the behaviorists to the Wequassett Inn in Chatham, Mass. The conference was given the quaint title "How Humans Behave," as if monetary policymakers had suddenly realized that, lo and behold, on the other end of all that policy are actual people. The collection of mainstream economists and central bankers would be the highest-level audience the behaviorists had ever enjoyed, the best chance yet for their new thinking to hit the bloodstream.

From the outset the mood was civil, especially considering that the behaviorists are essentially calling for an end to economics as we know it. (As one economist grumbled, "What you have to understand is that behavioral economics is attacking the foundation of what welfare economics is built on.") So it was not surprising that some Fed elders seemed wary, as if they were at a family reunion and welcoming a distant cousin about whom they had heard only puzzling rumors. But with the economy stuck in a condition between dismal and desperate, the behaviorists' timing could not have been better.

"All our models and forecasts say we'll see a better second half," Cathy E. Minehan, president of the Boston Fed, said in her opening address. "But we said that last year. Now don't get me wrong: mathematical models are wonderful tools. But are there ways this process can be done better? Can we inform the policymaker from 50,000 feet with wisdom gained on the ground, in the human brain, or in the way humans make decisions and organize themselves? I hope so."

Ms. Minehan and her colleagues were particularly hoping to learn why Americans save too little, acquire too much expensive debt and perform such achingly self-destructive feats of portfolio management. The behaviorists, for their part, were put in a tight spot: eager to prove themselves but leery of overpromising. "Virtually everyone doing behavioral economics agrees we should go slowly in advocating policy change," Mr. Camerer wrote in the paper he presented. "Our thinking was also not designed to precisely answer questions about welfare and policy, but this is a good time in the intellectual history of the field to say something."

Eldar Shafir, who teaches psychology and public affairs at Princeton, began with a behavioral economics primer. It was full of the anomalies the field is known for, including the popular "6 jam-vs.-24 jam" experiment. In an upscale grocery story, researchers set up a tasting booth first with 6 jars of jams, and later with 24 jars. In the first case, 40 percent of the customers stopped to taste and 30 percent bought; in the second, 60 percent tasted but only 3 percent bought. The point is that too many options can flummox a consumer — and if 24 jars of jam pose a problem, imagine what 8,000 mutual funds can do. Standard economics would argue that people are better off with more options. But behavioral economics argues that people behave less like mathematical models than like — well, people.

Among the behaviorists, there is the common sentiment that economics has been ruined by math. "Neoclassical economists came along in the mid-19th century and wanted to mathematize the new science of economics," said George Loewenstein, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University. "They couldn't include `the passions,' or emotions, in their models, because they were too unruly, too complex. But they also thought that the emotions were unknowable."

Mr. Loewenstein described how he and his colleagues want to prove otherwise — that not only are emotions not unknowable but that when it comes to money, they may be more powerful than math. This is why Mr. Loewenstein studies how people make financial choices while they are experiencing various degrees of sadness, hunger and sexual arousal. This is why Colin Camerer has become a student of brain imaging, trying to identify where a subject's brain lights up when, for instance, a lowball offer leaves him disgusted.

But the most radical idea presented at the conference belonged to Richard H. Thaler. His paper, written with the legal scholar Cass R. Sunstein, was called "Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron." Leonine and youthful at 57, Mr. Thaler, who teaches at the University of Chicago, is widely considered the founder of behavioral economics (and some say, its next Nobel winner). He is more confident and, accordingly, more prescriptive than his younger colleagues.

"Behavioral economics offers powerful tools to achieve policy goals," he told the conference. "And libertarian paternalism is an attractive approach to solving policy problems. What else? I think the only other alternative is inept neglect."

Mr. Thaler has concluded that too many people, no matter how educated or vigilant, are poor planners, inconsistent savers and haphazard investors. His solution: public and private institutions should gently steer individuals toward more enlightened choices. That is, they must be saved from themselves. Mr. Thaler's most concrete idea is Save More Tomorrow (SMarT), a savings plan whereby employees pledge a share of their future salary increases to a retirement account. In test cases, the plan has proved remarkably successful.

"This was not pulled out of thin air," Mr. Thaler said. "It was done using what I call first-grade psychology. We knew this was going to work, no question." Indeed, the SMarT plan takes advantage of behavioral economics' basic tenets: "loss aversion" (people fear loss because it causes them far more pain than the pleasure they receive from gain; but since the SMarT plan covers a future raise, they never feel its loss); "status-quo bias" (since people are reluctant to change, the change can be made for them); and "mental accounting" (people have a pressing need to direct different streams of money into different "accounts").

Mr. Thaler was followed by David I. Laibson, a young Harvard behaviorist who also endorsed a paternalistic approach. "There are two enormous travesties in the financial services industry," Mr. Laibson said. "One, people have too much of their own company's stock, and two, mutual-fund management fees are too high." His solution to the first problem: an automatic asset reallocation to keep an employee from holding more than 20 percent of his portfolio in company stock.

"People could opt out," he said. "If you're crazy enough to do that, fine, that's your right, but we'd certainly push them down." His solution to the second problem: warning labels about management fees, modeled after the surgeon general's cigarette warning.

Mr. Laibson's and Mr. Thaler's proposals were warmly received by the bankers and mainstream economists. If this is behavioral economics, what's not to like? The proposals seemed to be sound and not particularly invasive solutions to Americans' troubling money habits. All the earlier talk of sexual-arousal studies and brain imaging may have left them flat; but here were some real action items.

The behaviorists, most of whom are hardcore empiricists, even felt comfortable enough to declare their own research wish lists. Dan Ariely of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology trolled the room for a good contact at the Internal Revenue Service (he wants to study the psychology of tax cheats). Duncan J. Watts, a sociologist at Columbia University, half-jokingly requested access to the phone and e-mail records of all Federal Reserve employees (he is looking for good data to better understand how organizations behave).

The warm reception didn't mean wholesale conversion. When Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, the Boston Fed's chief economist, was asked about Mr. Camerer's desire for a new Economics 101 textbook, one that puts behaviorism at the center and mathematical modeling on the fringe, he responded: "Yeah, that's his `I Have a Dream' speech. I think that's still weeks off."

Still, Mr. Fuhrer, who organized the conference, was delighted with its outcome: "I think we would have been crazy to expect we'd walk out of this conference and say, `O.K., we're going to our next meeting, and now we know what to do because these guys told us.' But having had these conversations, where people look at economics from a different viewpoint, will we think a little differently about how we do research and exactly which people we might talk to? You bet we will."

They may have little choice. As Frederick S. Breimyer, chief economist of the State Street Corporation in Boston, said, "We're looking outside the box because the box we've been looking inside is empty."

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company. Reprinted from The New York Times, Arts & Ideas, of June 28, 2003.

使用道具

10
midi51 发表于 2004-10-24 20:54:00 |只看作者 |坛友微信交流群

和9楼相关的网页:

FRBB: How Humans Behave- Papers and Presentations

http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf48/

使用道具

您需要登录后才可以回帖 登录 | 我要注册

本版微信群
加JingGuanBbs
拉您进交流群

京ICP备16021002-2号 京B2-20170662号 京公网安备 11010802022788号 论坛法律顾问:王进律师 知识产权保护声明   免责及隐私声明

GMT+8, 2024-5-2 02:34